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Exploring the Impact of the Marriage Amendments:  Can Public Employers Offer Domestic 
Partner Benefits to Their Gay and Lesbian Employees? 
 
Tiffany C. Graham1 
 
Introduction 
 
Over the course of the past decade, the question of same-sex marriage has been one of the 
most contentious issues affecting this country.  Since 1998, forty-four states have prohibited the 
creation or recognition of same-sex marriage,2 and twenty-seven states have solidified their 
positions on this issue through the passage of state constitutional amendments.3  Eighteen of 
these amendments extend their prohibitions even farther by refusing to create or recognize civil 
unions, domestic partnerships, or any other alternative to traditional marriage that is patterned 
after marriage.4  It is this last group of amendments that currently poses a potentially intractable 
problem:  is the language employed by these amendments so broad that they arguably prevent 
public entities5 from providing domestic partner benefits to their gay and lesbian employees?  
Public institutions around the country – especially institutions of higher learning – are struggling 
with this issue.  If current law prevents them from offering domestic partner benefits, how can 
they compete effectively for talented gay and lesbian employees, and retain the ones they 
currently have? 
This concern is neither trivial nor hypothetical.  The University of Wisconsin, for 
instance, recently lost a top nanotechnology researcher to the University of Pennsylvania because 
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 See Appendix 1.  The state amendments referenced here are the following:  Alabama (Ala. Const. amend. 774), 
Arkansas (Ark. Const. amend. 3), Georgia (Ga. Const. art. I, § 4), Idaho (Idaho Const. art. III, § XXVIII), Kansas 
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III A. (arguing that recognition is a term of art that requires state action for its operation). 
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Penn, unlike Wisconsin, offers a domestic partner benefits plan.6  Partially for identical reasons, 
another Wisconsin employee – this time, a highly-placed administrator – took a deanship 
position at Arizona State University.7  The Student Housing Director at the University of Kansas 
recently expressed her support for a proposed partner benefits plan so that she can cover her 
soon-to-be-retired life partner.8  Even though she and her partner wish to remain in Kansas, the 
director has noted that moving to a school in another state would net her the benefits that she and 
her partner need.9  This controversy over domestic partner benefits has also become an issue at 
the University of Texas at Austin, where a lecturer in Arabic staged a hunger strike to publicize 
the university’s failure to offer partner benefits to its gay and lesbian employees.10  The 
university, however, maintained that its hands were tied:  state law prevented it from offering 
family or spousal benefits to any person not recognized as a spouse or family member under 
Texas law.11 
In addition, public employers in Ohio, Kentucky, Idaho, Louisiana, and Michigan – each 
of whose amendments falls into the problematic category – are currently addressing explicit 
challenges to their ability to offer partner benefits to their gay and lesbian employees.  A state 
legislator in Ohio, for instance, has filed suit against Miami University, alleging that its domestic 
partner benefits program violates the marriage amendment.12  Similarly, the Kentucky Senate has 
recently passed a bill which prohibits government agencies from offering partner benefits to their 
gay and lesbian employees.13  In Idaho, the Attorney General has issued an opinion which finds 
that the City of Moscow’s decision to offer benefits to the domestic partners of its employees 
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Moreover, she noted that several of her colleagues had begun looking for new jobs because of the lack of partner 
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 See Stephanie  Steitzer, Bill Bans Same-Sex Partner Benefits, THE COURIER-JOURNAL, available at, 
http://www.courier-journal.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080131/NEWS0101/801310406  (Jan. 31, 2008 ).  
The University of Kentucky and the University of Louisville began offering partner benefits in 2006.  See id.  They 
have argued that passage of this bill will hamper their ability to recruit the most talented individuals.  See id. 
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likely “constitute[d] recognition of a domestic legal union other than marriage” in violation of 
the marriage amendment.14  Finally, parties in Louisiana are in the midst of litigation concerning 
the validity of New Orleans’ domestic partner benefit plan.15  Other potential challenges are 
certainly looming on the horizon.16 
This impending wave of employee-benefits litigation will force courts to address a 
variety of interpretive challenges as they consider the operative scope of the amendments.  
Among the states that have marriage amendments, they can be broken down into two broad 
categories:  (1) Single-Subject Amendments (“SSAs”) and (2) Multi-Subject Amendments 
(“MSAs”).  SSAs merely prohibit same-sex marriage; MSAs prohibit both same-sex marriage 
and the establishment of state-recognized relationship regimes that are parallel or akin to 
marriage.  Of course, the language used by the MSAs varies wildly from state to state; therefore, 
the effect of each amendment on a particular dispute may differ somewhat from state to state.17  
These distinctions notwithstanding, two textual patterns have emerged:  (1) the first pattern 
prohibits the states from granting the rights, benefits, privileges, or incidents of marriage to 
unmarried couples generally or same-sex couples in particular; and (2) the second pattern 
establishes a more generalized set of prohibitions.  In this Article, I describe the former group of 
amendments as “Incidents Model” MSAs and the latter group of amendments as “Comparative 
Model” MSAs.  This paper will focus on the impact of the Comparative Model MSAs.   
The scope of the prohibitions in the Comparative Model MSAs will ultimately turn on the 
degree of replication between marriage and any parallel regime that is forbidden by the 
amendment in question.  As such, the Comparative Model MSAs lend themselves to further 
subdivision into three categories:  (1) those that prohibit both same-sex marriage and parallel 
arrangements that are identical to marriage; (2) those that prohibit same-sex marriage and 
parallel arrangements that are identical or substantially similar to marriage; and (3) those that 
prohibit same-sex marriage and parallel arrangements that are similar to marriage.  At present, 
domestic partner benefits plans which are offered by public employers face huge potential threats 
in Comparative Model MSAs states because their effectiveness depends on state recognition of 
relationships that arguably mimic marriage to a prohibited degree. 
How should courts address these challenges under their respective marriage amendments 
when they inevitably arise?  Numerous scholars would argue that the amendments are flatly 
unconstitutional and should not apply to anything at all.18  Other scholars eschew this approach 
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 See City of Moscow, Health Insurance Policy, Idaho Op. Att’y Gen. 9 (2008). 
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 See Ralph v. City of New Orleans, No. 2003-09871, Civ. D. Ct. Parish of Orleans (Jan. 15, 2008). 
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 The local governments of Dallas, Texas and Travis County, Texas (which includes Austin) offer medical benefits, 
dental benefits, and COBRA to government employees.  See Sarah Coppola, City Weighs Cost of Higher Health 
Plan, Austin-American Statesman, May 6, 2006, at D1.  In addition, Ohio State University offers health care 
benefits to the domestic partners of its employees.  See THE STATE OF THE WORKPLACE, supra n. 6, at 52 (listing 
Ohio State University as one of the schools offering domestic partner benefits to its employees).  All of these 
programs may find themselves subject to attack under the terms of Ohio’s and Texas’ respective amendments.   
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 See, e.g., Mark Strasser, State Marriage Amendments & Overreaching:  On Plain Meaning, Good Public Policy, 
and Constitutional Limitations, 25 LAW & INEQU. 59, 60-62 (2007) (hereinafter “Plain Meaning”) (describing the 
various textual differences that exist among the amendments). 
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 See id. at 59 (arguing that the marriage amendments should be narrowly-construed in order to avoid 
constitutionally infirm applications); see also L. Lynn Hogue, Romer Revisited, or “The Devil in the Details”:  Is 
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by considering whether various material goods – including domestic partner benefits – are 
threatened by the enforcement of these amendments.19  In this Article, I will also consider the 
impact of enforcement, but I will do so by proposing an interpretive methodology that courts 
may use when trying to evaluate the validity of domestic partner benefits plans.20  I ultimately 
conclude that such plans do not violate the provisions of the first two sub-categories of 
Comparative Model MSAs, but may, in fact, violate the provisions of the third sub-category.  In 
order to evaluate whether the plans do violate the provisions of the third sub-category of 
Comparative Model MSAs, I recommend that courts look at the history underlying the passage 
of the amendments and determine whether the voters intended to prohibit public employers from 
offering such plans.  If the answer to this question is yes, then the plans should be invalidated; if 
the answer to this question is no, then the plans should be upheld.  
Part One offers an overview of domestic partner benefits plans and discusses the manner 
in which they are currently being threatened by the interpretation of the Comparative Model 
MSAs.  This threat, however, begs an important question:  given the increased acceptance of 
gays and lesbians in many other areas of life, why, exactly, are these benefits regimes under 
threat?  A seeming paradox exists between the growing levels of tolerance for gays and lesbians 
in society and the decision by voters to support these amendments whose potential wide-ranging 
effect was communicated to them prior to the election.  What, exactly, did the voters intend to 
accomplish when they supported the passage of the marriage amendments?  Part One will 
conclude with an inquiry into this question. 
Part Two will then take a close look at one of these controversies, National Pride at Work 
v. Michigan, which is currently pending before the Michigan Supreme Court.  As a matter of first 
impression, this case represents the first time that a state court of last resort has considered the 
scope of a public entity’s authority to offer domestic partner benefits in light of the state’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
Georgia’s Marriage Amendment Constitutionally Defective?, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 255 (2005) (arguing that 
Georgia’s marriage amendment violates the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Romer v. Evans); Lisa M. 
Polk, Montana’s Marriage Amendment:  Unconstitutionally Denying a Fundamental Right, 66 MONT. L. REV. 405 
(2005) (arguing that Montana’s marriage amendment is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause and the 
Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment); Wilson Huhn, Ohio Issue 1 is Unconstitutional, 28 N.C. CENT. L. 
J. 1 (2005) (arguing that the Ohio marriage amendment is unconstitutional); Mark Strasser, Same-Sex Marriage 
Referenda and the Constitution:  On Hunter, Romer, and Electoral Process Guarantees, 64 ALB. L. REV. 949 (2001) 
(arguing that the same-sex marriage referenda violate electoral process guarantees); accord Mark Strasser, From 
Colorado to Alaska by Way of Cincinnati:  On Romer, Equality Foundation, and the Constitutionality of Referenda, 
36 HOUSTON L. REV. 1193 (1999); Sarah K. Snow, What Missouri ‘Shows Me’ About Sexual Orientation 
Legislation, 37 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 807 (2006) (arguing that Missouri’s marriage amendment is subject to challenge 
under Romer because animus motivated its passage); but see Kevin G. Clarkson, David Orgon Coolidge, & William 
C. Duncan, The Alaska Marriage Amendment:  The People’s Choice on the Last Frontier, 16 ALASKA L. REV. 213 
(1999) (arguing that the Alaska marriage amendment is constitutional). 
 
19
 See Strasser, supra n. 17, Plain Meaning, 25 LAW & INEQU. at 91-92 (arguing that the language of the Michigan 
marriage amendment should not prevent employers from offering domestic partner benefits); see also L. Lynn 
Hogue, State Choice-of-Law Doctrine & Non-Marital Same-Sex Partner Benefits:  How Will States Enforce the 
Public Policy Exception?, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 549 (2005) (arguing that none of the marriage amendments should 
preclude domestic partner benefits, and if they do, they might be vulnerable Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. 
Texas); William C. Duncan, Marriage Amendments and the Reader in Bad Faith, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 233, 
240-246 (2005) (suggesting that a careful interpretation of the marriage amendments will result in the invalidation of 
public employees’ domestic partner benefits plans, and the validation of others). 
 
20
 As noted, my focus is on the Comparative Model MSAs, but courts whose amendments do not fall into that 
category might still use the analysis that I propose. 
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marriage amendment.21  Analysis of both the factual backdrop of National Pride at Work and the 
case itself illustrates the interpretive difficulties that may arise when public employers in states 
with Comparative Model MSAs condition the receipt of partner benefits on the existence of the 
gay or lesbian relationship.  In this section, I will conclude that the Court of Appeals offered an 
interpretive methodology that was more appealing than the methodology offered by the trial 
court, but that the analysis grew less persuasive when the court failed to consider the role of 
voter intent when interpreting the meaning of the similarity provision in the Michigan 
amendment.   
After examining some of the methodological errors that a reviewing court might make, 
Part Three identifies the primary concepts in the Comparative Model MSAs – “recognition,”  
“status,” and “similarity to marriage” – and offers an analysis of these terms that will help courts 
understand them in the event that they are called upon to evaluate them.  In the course of the 
analysis, I find that a public employer’s decision to premise the dispensation of partner benefits 
on the existence of the employee’s relationship violates the prohibition against recognizing a 
status for unmarried individuals, but the crux of the analysis is the similarity provision:  if the 
status recognized by the state does not fall within the scope of the similarity provision laid out by 
the amendment, then the domestic partner benefits plan should be upheld. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Background 
 
A. Overview of Partner Benefits and the Marriage Amendments:  An 
Important Victory That is Currently Under Threat 
 
 
The dilemma that now faces the gay and lesbian community was probably inevitable.  
Over the course of the past twenty years, gays and lesbians have won gradually higher levels of 
acceptance from the public, and consequently, have achieved significant victories in many 
arenas.  Those arenas include, among others, protection against discrimination in employment 
and in public accommodations, the invalidation of anti-sodomy statutes, the establishment of 
adoption rights, and a remarkable increase in the number of openly-gay public officials. 22  Their 
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 Even though the Michigan Supreme Court will be the first high court to resolve this issue, it will not be the first 
court to do so.  In re Utah State Retirement Board considered whether Salt Lake City’s decision to provide health 
care benefits to the domestic partners of city employees violated Utah’s marriage amendment.  See In re Utah State 
Retirement Board, No. 050916879 (Utah D. Ct. 2006), available at http: www.acluutah.org/normanruling.pdf.  The 
trial court found that the “Adult Designee Benefit” established by the city did not give “’the same or substantially 
equivalent legal effect’ as marriage to any other ‘domestic union.’”  Id. at 4. 
 
22
 The United States Supreme Court, for instance, handed gays and lesbians two of their most significant legal 
victories to date in Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas.  In Romer, the Supreme Court invalidated Colorado’s 
Amendment 2, which prohibited state officials from extending anti-discrimination protection to gays and lesbians as 
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losses, however, have been most acute in the arena of marriage rights, and these failures have 
fueled the current debate over domestic partner benefits.  
The quest for equal marriage rights is a short and familiar story.  In 1990, same-sex 
marriage was not legally recognized or permitted anywhere in this country.  Since then, of 
course, a handful of states have legalized same-sex relationships to varying degrees:  several 
have established relationship regimes that carry with them limited sets of rights,23 while others 
have established relationship regimes that parallel marriage as closely as possible.24  
Massachusetts, of course, is the lone state that has allowed gays and lesbians to marry.25  These 
victories, however, do not represent the generally prevailing political norm.  From 1998-2003, 
six states passed amendments banning same-sex marriage.  Since then, however, twenty-one 
states have done so.26  The move to ban same-sex marriage reached its high point with the 
                                                                                                                                                             
a class.  See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623-626 (1996).  The Supreme Court in Lawrence invalidated anti-
sodomy statutes across the nation, prompting several noted academics to compare the impact of the case to Brown v. 
Board of Education.  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-579 (2003); see also Michael J. Klarman, Brown & 
Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 487-489 (2005) (arguing that Lawrence may take the same path 
as Brown – initially vilified in certain quarters, but ultimately viewed as a model of progress); Pamela S. Karlan, 
Introduction:  Same-Sex Marriage as Moving Story, 16 STAN. L. & POL. REV. 1 (2005) (suggesting that Lawrence 
might be the equivalent of Brown for the gay rights movement if it eventually leads the Supreme Court to strike 
down laws against same-sex marriage); accord Constitutional Law Symposium:  The Role of Courts in Social 
Change, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 903, 904 (2006) (identifying Professor Jane Schacter as a panel participant who noted 
the sense among members of the gay rights movement that “[Lawrence] is our Brown.”).  In addition, at least eleven 
states and the District of Columbia either implicitly or explicitly permit gay and lesbian couples to adopt children.  
See Gary J. Gates, et al., ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE BY GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 3 
(March 2007), available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/WilliamsInstitute/publications/FinalAdoptionReport.pdf (last 
visited March 11, 2008).  On the political front, twenty states and the District of Columbia prohibit discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation.  See infra n. 56.  Twelve of those states and the District of Columbia also prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of gender identity.  See infra n. 57.  In addition, there are approximately four hundred 
openly gay elected officials in the United States.  See Rachel La Corte, Only N.H. Has More Gay Lawmakers Than 
Washington, HERALDNET, Jan. 23, 2008, available at 
http://www.heraldnet.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080123/NEWS03/559000605&template=printart, (last 
visited March 11, 2008).  Finally, public and private employers around the country have been offering their 
employees domestic partner benefits in ever-increasing numbers.  See infra nn. ___.  These victories, and others, 
attest to the fact that gay and lesbian issues are reshaping various aspects of the American legal and political 
landscape. 
 
23
  Hawaii, Maine, Washington, and the District of Columbia offer limited protection to committed gay and lesbian 
relationships.  See HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1.6 (2007); see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.5, § 4572 (2007); WASH. 
REV. CODE § 26.60.060 (2007); D.C. STAT. § 32-701 et seq. (2008).  
 
24
 Vermont, Connecticut, New Jersey, and New Hampshire have passed civil union statutes which guarantee gay and 
lesbian couples all of the same rights that married heterosexual couples receive under state law.  See VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 15, § 1204 (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. 46b-38aa (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37: 1-31 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 457-A:1 (2007).  Similarly, California, and Oregon have created equally generous regimes, but rather than 
using the “civil unions” terminology, they instead use the term “domestic partnership.”  See CAL. FAMILY CODE § 
297 (2008); see also OREGON FAMILY FAIRNESS ACT, H. 2007, 74th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007). 
 
25
 See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).  Not only did Massachusetts legalize 
same-sex marriage in Goodridge, the state legislature defeated an effort to overturn the decision by means of a 
constitutional amendment.  See Frank Phillips, Legislators Vote to Defeat Same-Sex Marriage Ban (June 14, 2007), 
available at http://www.boston.com/news/globe/city_region/breaking_news/2007/06/legislators_vot_1.html. 
 
26
 See HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Marriage in the Fifty States, supra n. 2. 
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passage of eleven amendments during the 2004 presidential election.27  The frenzy surrounding 
the passage of the amendments has died down substantially in the United States, but the reality 
of their presence is making itself known.   
At the same time that voters have been placing limits on the ability of gays and lesbians 
to formalize their relationships, increasing numbers are embracing their sexuality and publicly 
making the lifestyle choices that heterosexual couples make:  they are entering into committed 
relationships with their partners, buying homes in cities and suburbs, adopting and raising 
children, volunteering in their communities, and building careers.  Public and private employers 
have observed these shifts in the American social landscape and responded to these changes in a 
variety of ways.  One of the most significant responses has been through the provision of 
domestic partner benefits for their gay and lesbian employees.    
American employers have been providing partner benefits since 1982, when the Village 
Voice newspaper began offering them to their unmarried employees.28  Just over twenty-five 
years later, approximately 9300 employers in the United States currently offer domestic partner 
benefits, the most common of which are health care benefits.29  Such employers include more 
than half of Fortune 500 companies, almost eighty percent of Fortune 100 companies, eighty-
eight of the hundred top-grossing law firms, thirteen state governments and the District of 
Columbia government, 145 city and county governments, and more than 300 colleges and 
universities (of which approximately 141 are public schools).30  Fifty-eight percent of employers 
offer domestic partner benefits to both same-sex and opposite couples.31  The remaining 
companies limit their programs to same-sex couples because they do not have the option of 
marriage.32 
Employers have chosen to offer these benefits packages for a variety of reasons.  First of 
all, many employers choose to offer partner benefits as a mechanism for recruiting and retaining 
talented workers and to gain a competitive advantage over employers who do not offer these 
benefits.33  Other employers are compelled to offer partner benefits as a result of the labor 
                                                 
27
 See CNN.com: Election Results, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/ballot.measures/  
28
 See Alene Russell, Domestic Partnership Benefits:  Equity, Fairness, and Competitive Advantage, A HIGHER 
EDUCATION BRIEF (American Association of State Colleges and Universities, Oct. 2007) (hereinafter “Equity, 
Fairness, and Competitive Advantage”). 
 
29
 See id. (discussing the number of employers in the nation who offer partner benefits).; see also Mary Beth 
Braitman, Terry A.M. Mumford, and Katrina M. Clingerman, Implementing a Domestic Partner Benefits Policy, 
HUMAN RESOURCES 192 (Winter 2008), available at http://www.icemiller.com/publications/19-ANSWR-
Winter2008.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2008) (detailing the kinds of benefits that employers typically cover). 
 
30
 See id. at 4-5 (discussing the number of employers providing partner benefits across multiple sectors of the 
economy); see also THE STATE OF THE WORKPLACE, supra n. 6, at 21 (same). 
 
31
 See Russel, Equity, Fairness, and Competitive Advantage, supra n. 28, at 4. 
 
32
 See Samir Luther, DOMESTIC PARTNER BENEFITS:  EMPLOYER TRENDS AND BENEFITS EQUIVALENCY FOR THE 
GLBT FAMILY 9 (March 2006), available at http://www.hrc.org/documents/Guide-to-Employer-Trends-and-
Benefits-Equivalency-for-the-GLBT-Family.pdf. 
 
33
 See Braitman, et al., Implementing a Domestic Partner Benefits Policy, supra n. 29, at 189.   
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negotiations process.34  Still others do so “because they believe it is the right thing to do.”35  
Employers who fall into this last category are often committed to supporting diversity in the 
workplace and providing equal pay for equal work:  in the absence of benefits, gay and lesbian 
employees receive significantly less compensation than their married colleagues who do receive 
such benefits – roughly one-fifth of overall compensation is derived from employer-provided 
benefits.36 
The marriage amendments, of course, now threaten much of the progress signified by the 
provision of partner benefits.  Although private sector employers are not affected,37 public 
employers might find that one (potentially) unintended effect of the amendments is the loss of 
their authority to offer domestic partner benefits to their gay and lesbian employees.38  One-third 
of the amendments restrict only the creation or recognition of same-sex marriage,39 but most of 
the remaining two-thirds prohibit the creation or recognition of a legal status for unmarried 
people that would be similar to marriage.40  It is this latter group of amendments that poses the 
real challenge.  If, for instance, a public employer subject to one of these amendments offered 
partner benefits to a lesbian employee who met eligibility criteria that turned on the existence of 
her relationship, did the employer recognize a legal status for this union in violation of the 
                                                 
34
 See id. 
 
35
 Id. 
 
36
 See THE STATE OF THE WORKPLACE, supra n. 6, at 13.   Gay and lesbian employees, however, have not received 
these benefits as a matter of course.  In many instances, advocates have had to fight for their provision.  The 
American Civil Liberties Union, for example, has filed a lawsuit against the University of Wisconsin because of its 
refusal to allow gay and lesbian employees to include domestic partners on their health insurance plans.  See 
Helgeland v. Wisconsin, 724 N.W.2d 208, 215 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) (arguing that a law which prevents state 
employers from offering domestic partner health insurance violates the state’s constitutional guarantee of equal 
protection).  Subsequent to the filing of this lawsuit, Wisconsin approved a marriage amendment which states in 
part, “A legal status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be valid 
or recognized in this state.”  See Appendix 1; cf. Snetsinger v. Montana University Sys., 104 P. 3d 445, 452 (Mont. 
2004) (holding that a university policy which provided health insurance coverage for the opposite-sex partners of its 
unmarried employees while denying such coverage to the same-sex partners of its gay employees could not 
withstand scrutiny under Montana’s equal protection clause). 
 
37
 See supra n. 5 (discussing the implied state action requirement contained in the amendments). 
 
38
  Unmarried heterosexual employees who work for public entities and qualify for domestic partner benefits are also 
threatened with the loss of partner coverage, but this Article will focus on gay and lesbian employees. 
 
39
 See e.g., Alaska (Ala. Const. art. I, § 25), Colorado (Colo. Const. art. II, § 31), Hawaii (Haw. Const. art. I, § 23), 
Mississippi (Miss. Const. art. XIV, § 263A), Missouri (Mo. Const. art. I, § 33), Montana (Mont. Const. art. XIII, § 
7), Nevada (Nev. Const. art. I, § 21), Oregon (Or. Const. art. XV, § 5), and Tennessee (Tenn. Const. art. XI, § 18). 
40
 See e.g., Alabama (Ala. Const. amend. 774), Arkansas (Ark. Const. amend. 3), Georgia (Ga. Const. art. I, § 4), 
Idaho (Idaho Const. art. III, § XXVIII), Kansas (Kan. Const. art. XV, § 16), Kentucky (Ky. Const. pt. 2, § 233A), 
Louisiana (La. Const. art. XII, §15), Michigan (Mich. Const. art. I, § 25), Nebraska (Neb. Const. art. I, § 29), North 
Dakota (N.D. Const. art. XI, § 28), Ohio (Ohio Const. art. XV, § 11), Oklahoma (Okla. Const. art. II, § 35), South 
Carolina (S.C. Const. art. XVII, § 15), South Dakota (S.D. Const. art. XXI, § 9), Texas (Tex. Const. art. I, § 32), 
Utah (Utah Const. art. I, § 29), Virginia (Va. Const. art. I, § 15), and Wisconsin (Wis. art. XIII, § 13).   
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amendment?41  Moreover, if it did, is this the outcome that the voters had in mind when they 
voted in favor of the marriage amendments? 
 
 
 
B. Comparative Model MSAs and Voter Intent 
 
As noted above, the marriage amendments can be broken down into two categories.  Nine 
of the twenty-seven amendments – the Single-Subject Amendments (“SSAs”) – focus 
exclusively on defining marriage as the union between a man and a woman.  The SSA states are 
Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Tennessee.42  
By contrast, the remaining amendments – the Multi-Subject Amendments (“MSAs”) – not only 
limit marriage to heterosexual unions but also prohibit state courts and legislatures from creating 
or recognizing unions that are similar in some fashion to marriage.43  Finally, the MSAs 
themselves break down into the Incidents Model MSAs and the Comparative Model MSAs. 
Generally speaking, the Comparative Model MSAs not only bar states from treating 
same-sex unions as marriages, but also from creating or recognizing a legal status for any 
                                                 
41
 One particular source of concern is the continued validity of partner benefits programs offered by local 
governments across the country.  Within the states whose amendments are especially problematic, the following 
localities may find their policies subject to challenge:  Fayetteville, Arkansas; Atlanta, Georgia; Decatur, Georgia; 
DeKalb County, Georgia; Fulton County, Georgia; City of Moscow, Idaho; New Orleans, Louisiana; Detroit, 
Michigan; East Lansing, Michigan; Ingham County, Michigan; Washtenaw County, Michigan; Cleveland Heights, 
Ohio; Columbus, Ohio; Dallas, Texas; Travis County, Texas; Arlington County, Virginia; Dane County, Wisconsin; 
La Crosse County, Wisconsin; Madison, Wisconsin; and Milwaukee, Wisconsin.  See THE HUMAN RIGHTS 
CAMPAIGN, EMPLOYERS THAT OFFER DOMESTIC PARTNER HEALTH BENEFITS (2007), available at 
www.hrc.org/workplace/dpbsearch (last visited on Feb. 26, 2008); see also Intervening Defendants’ Memorandum 
in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, Ralph v. City of New Orleans, No. 2003-9871 
(listing numerous local governments across the country that offer domestic partner benefits packages for 
employees); City of Moscow, Health Insurance Policy, Idaho Op. Att’y Gen. 1, 3 (2008) (concluding that the City of 
Moscow, Idaho likely violated the state marriage amendment when it implemented a benefits plan for the domestic 
partners of its employees).  
 
42
 See Alaska (Ala. Const. art. I, § 25), Colorado (Colo. Const. art. II, § 31), Hawaii (Haw. Const. art. I, § 23), 
Mississippi (Miss. Const. art. XIV, § 263A), Missouri (Mo. Const. art. I, § 33), Montana (Mont. Const. art. XIII, § 
7), Nevada (Nev. Const. art. I, § 21), Oregon (Or. Const. art. XV, § 5), and Tennessee (Tenn. Const. art. XI, § 18).  
Hawaii’s SSA is unique in that it grants the legislature exclusive authority to limit marriage to a man and a women. 
See Haw. Const. art. I, § 23 (“The legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples”).   
43
 See Alabama (Ala. Const. amend. 774), Arkansas,(Ark. Const. amend. 3), Georgia (Ga. Const. art. I, § 4), Idaho 
(Idaho Const. art. III, § 28), Kansas (Kan. Const. art. XV, § 16), Kentucky (Ky. Const. pt. 2, § 233A), Louisiana 
(La. Const. art. XII, §15), Michigan (Mich. Const. art. I, § 25), Nebraska (Neb. Const. art. I, § 29), North Dakota 
(N.D. Const. art. XI, § 28), Ohio (Ohio Const. art. XV, § 11), Oklahoma (Okla. Const. art. II, § 35), South Carolina 
(S.C. Const. art. XVII, § 15), South Dakota (S.D. Const. art. XXI, § 9) , Texas (Tex. Const. art. I, § 32), Utah (Utah 
Const. art. I, § 29), Virginia (Va. Const. art. I, § 15), and Wisconsin (Wis. art. XIII, § 13). By way of comparison, 
Connecticut, New Hampshire, New Jersey and Vermont have passed civil unions statutes which guarantee gay and 
lesbian couples all of the same rights that married heterosexual couples receive under state law. See e.g. VT. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 15, § 1204 (2000) Similarly, California, Oregon, and Washington have created equally generous regimes, 
but rather than using the “civil unions” terminology, they instead use the term “domestic partnership.” See e.g. Cal. 
Family Code § 297 2005. Finally, Maine and Hawaii offer limited protection to committed gay and lesbian 
relationships. See e.g. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.5, § 4572 (2005). 
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unmarried relationship. Meeting this latter prohibition, however, will not itself violate the 
amendment.  Instead, the policy in question must also violate a final provision in the amendment 
– one which identifies the degree of similarity to traditional marriage that the amendments 
permit.  In a Comparative Model regime, then, a gay or lesbian public employee may lose (or 
never acquire) partner benefits when two conditions are met:  (1) if the state has conferred a legal 
status on his or her relationship, and (2) if that status is sufficiently close to marriage to violate 
the similarity provision.  Conversely, even if a status has been conferred on the relationship, the 
employee should receive partner benefits if that status is not close enough to marriage to violate 
the similarity provision.  Ultimately, the scope of the prohibition depends on the language of the 
amendments, and they become operative under one of three circumstances: (1) if the creation or 
recognition of a legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals is identical to marriage; 
(2) if the creation or recognition of a legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals is 
identical or substantially similar to marriage; or (3) if the creation or recognition of a legal status 
for unmarried individuals is similar to marriage.44  The meaning of these terms is arguably 
unclear:  What does it mean to have a “legal status”?  If the language of the amendment 
specifically precludes the recognition of a “union” rather than a “legal status,” does recognition 
of the union imply the existence of a “legal status”?  What does it mean to “recognize” a “union” 
or a “legal status”?  If an amendment prohibits the creation or recognition of a legal status that is 
“similar” to marriage, at what point do resemblances rise to the level of improper “similarity”?   
The ambiguity of the language in the Comparative Model MSAs suggests a rather 
troubling conclusion:  the voters who passed the amendment may not have truly understood the 
potential of their operative scope.  This, then, begs an important preliminary question:  why did 
they approve the amendments in the first place?  The answer to this question is hinted at by two 
sources of information:  (1) the sections of the amendments that are clear, and (2) the political 
context in which the amendments were adopted.  As noted, all of the amendments contain 
explicit prohibitions on same-sex marriage:  gay and lesbian couples may neither get married in 
these states nor expect recognition if they marry in other states.45   Popular disapproval of gay 
marriage was quite strong, and it is possible that the voters’ approval of the anti-marriage 
provisions would have outweighed any concerns about the ambiguous provisions. 
Beyond that, the political context surrounding the amendments inspired worry in some 
voters that their preferences were at risk of being ignored.  The near-validation of same-sex 
marriage in Baehr, its actual validation in Goodridge, and the spate of illegal marriage 
ceremonies around the country made some voters fear that gay marriage was just a court decision 
or renegade mayoral action away.46   Moreover, state supreme courts in Vermont and New Jersey 
forced their legislatures to implement civil union legislation, once again taking a decision about 
the status of same-sex relationships out of the hands of the people.47  Undoubtedly, many voters 
                                                 
44
 See Appendix 1. 
 
45
 See Appendices 1-3. 
 
46
  See, e.g., Jameel Naqvi, Proposal Would Entrench Gay Marriage Ban, MICHIGAN DAILY, October 28, 2004  
(“Kristina Hemphill, spokeswoman for Citizens for the Protection of Marriage, which collected the required 
signatures to put the proposal on the ballot, said an amendment would ‘keep Michigan from going through the fiasco 
that has occurred in other states.’”); see also Okla. Const. art. 2, § 34(C) (“Any person knowingly issuing a marriage 
license in violation of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”). 
 
47
 See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) ; see also Lewis v. Harris, 98 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006). 
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were motivated by twin concerns:  a desire to reserve marriage and its privileges exclusively for 
heterosexuals, and a fear that they would have no role in defining the emerging position of gays 
and lesbians in society.  In every state except for Arizona, voters removed the marriage question 
from the arena of debate.48 
The striking success of the anti-gay marriage movement shows that this issue is the 
Waterloo of progress for equality advocates.  Nonetheless, the American public seems ready to 
extend some benefits and protections to gays and lesbians, as shown by the fact that 55 percent of 
Americans support civil unions for gay couples, as well as the fact that several states have 
already moved in this direction.49   These numbers reflect a growing shift in perception about gay 
acceptability within our culture, as evidenced by political and cultural changes which have 
almost certainly left their mark.  Gays and lesbians are “coming out” to their friends and families 
at increasingly younger ages.50  Anti-gay bias is on the decline.51   Twenty states and the District 
of Columbia prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.52  Twelve of those states 
and the District of Columbia also prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender identity.53   Gay 
contestants on reality shows like Project Runway enjoy widespread popularity, and dramas like 
Mad Men, The L Word, The Wire, and The Shield offer a sophisticated vision of the complexity 
of gay and lesbian lives.54  Gays and lesbians are gradually becoming a normalized segment of 
mainstream American life. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
48
 William Butte, California’s Decisions Could Affect Florida, SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL, Feb. 15, 2008, p. 
25A (discussing the defeat of the marriage amendment in Arizona). 
 
49
 See, e.g., Gary Langer, Poll:  Support for Civil Unions Rises, Yet Sharp Divisions Remain (Nov. 8, 2007), 
available at http://abcnews.go.com/PollingUnit/story?id=3834625&page=1.  
 
50
 See, e.g., Average Coming-Out Age Now 13 (Oct. 11, 2006), available at 
http://www.gay.com/news/article.html?2006/10/11/4 (discussing the fact that gays and lesbians are public 
announcing their sexuality at earlier ages in their lives). 
 
51
 See, e.g., American Prejudice, ZOGBY INTERNAT’L (July 2007), available at 
http://www.zogby.com/gsn/GSNReport.pdf (finding that 87% of Americans believe that gays and lesbians should be 
free from workplace discrimination); but see Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI Releases 2006 Hate Crime 
Statistics (Nov. 2007) (noting that approximately 15.5% of hate crimes committed in 2006 were motivated by sexual 
orientation bias), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/hc2006/pressrelease.html.  
 
52
 Those states are California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, 
Washington, and Wisconsin.  See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, STATEWIDE EMPLOYMENT LAWS AND POLICIES, 
www.hrc.org/state_laws (last updated November 26, 2007). 
 
53
 See id. 
 
54
 Each show referenced above has done a masterful job of including  (or focusing on) gay and lesbian 
contestants/characters:  A disproportionate number of the male contestants on Bravo’s Project Runway are openly 
gay;  AMC’s Mad Men, set on Madison Avenue in the pre-Stonewall 1960s, features two recurring characters who 
struggle with the loneliness of the closet; Showtime’s The L Word is a glossy soap opera devoted to the romantic 
entanglements of a group of lesbian friends; HBO’s The Wire features both a well-respected lesbian police officer 
and a gay lone wolf gangster who steals drug stashes from the major players in town while armed with a sawed-off 
shotgun; and finally, FX’s The Shield showed the “ex-gay” movement through the eyes of a deeply religious gay 
police officer who rejected his sexuality.  See Project Runway, 
http://www.bravotv.com/Project_Runway//index.php; see also Mad Men, 
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How, then, can one reconcile these changes with the fact that voters across the country 
supported the Comparative Model MSAs by very comfortable margins?  The nation’s growing 
support for gays and lesbians notwithstanding, the evidence reflects a deep ambivalence about 
the name that we give to gay and lesbian relationships.  Many would argue that the most 
important “name,” or label, that one can place on a relationship is “marriage,” and voters were 
clearly not ready to extend to gays and lesbians this measure of equal social regard.  The growing 
approval of civil unions does not undermine this claim – even though the numbers suggest that 
more people are acknowledging both the humanity of gays and lesbians and the urgency of their 
practical needs, many of these supporters still balk at conferring the dignity attached to the label 
“marriage.”  At best, then, civil unions represent a compromise position:  committed gays and 
lesbians receive the tangible benefits of marriage, but the most important intangible benefit 
remains out of reach. 
The Comparative Model MSAs, of course, reject this compromise.  Voters who approved 
these amendments chose to deny gays and lesbians access to both the name of marriage and the 
universe of its attendant benefits.  This position is consistent with a view which holds that civil 
unions are nothing more than marriage by another name, and from the standpoint of consistency, 
if a voter rejects same-sex marriage, he or she should reject civil unions, too.  The desire to 
protect both the name and the substance of marriage created an impulse in the drafters that was 
frankly too clever:  anticipating efforts by legislators or judges to create a civil union equivalent 
by another name, the drafters included broad, prohibitory language in the amendments that 
simply covered too much ground.   
As a result, these amendments threaten consequences for gay and lesbian couples that are 
potentially devastating.  Ohio and Utah, for instance, have domestic violence statutes which 
cover unmarried couples who are “living as spouses” (including gay and lesbian couples).55  To 
date, both states have considered claims that the application of these statutes to individuals who 
are “living as spouses” recognizes a legal status that is similar to marriage, in violation of the 
terms of their respective amendments.56  In addition, the Nebraska Attorney General considered 
whether the legislature could pass a statute, consistent with its marriage amendment, allowing an 
individual’s domestic partner to donate organs from the decedent.57  The Attorney General 
concluded that doing so would violate the terms of the marriage amendment.58  The most 
significant challenges are occurring in those states whose public entities offer benefits to the 
domestic partners of their gay and lesbian employees:  the Kentucky Senate, for instance, has 
passed a bill that would prohibit public entities from implementing partner benefit policies; the 
Idaho Attorney General has issued an opinion finding that a town’s decision to offer such 
benefits likely violated the state constitution; a Salt Lake City trial court found that a provision in 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.amctv.com/originals/madmen/; The L Word, http://www.sho.com/site/lword/home.do; The Wire, 
http://www.hbo.com/thewire/; The Shield, http://www.fxnetworks.com/shows/originals/the_shield/main.html.   
55
 See discussion infra, Part III; see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-1(2)(b) (2008). 
 
56
 See discussion infra, Part III ; see also National Briefing Gay Marriage:  Get Ready for Congressional Slugfest 
Round Two, AMERICAN POLITICAL NETWORK, Vol. 10, No. 9, November  15, 2004 (noting that a Salt Lake City 
attorney had recently filed a motion to dismiss domestic violence charges against her client, arguing that Utah’s 
recently passed marriage amendment made the application of the statute unconstitutional to her unmarried client). 
 
57
 See Nebraska Op. Att’y Gen. No. 03004 (Mar. 10, 2003). 
 
58
 See id. 
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the city’s Public Employees Health Program extending coverage to the “Adult Designee” of an 
employee did not violate the state marriage amendment;59 and finally, litigation is ongoing over 
this issue in Ohio, Louisiana, and Michigan.60  This last set of examples poses a crucial question 
that the courts in those states are either in the process of answering, or may find themselves 
called upon to answer:  does the language in each state’s respective amendment prevent public 
entities from offering their gay and lesbian employees domestic partner benefits plans?   
Currently, the Michigan Supreme Court is reviewing a dispute that will likely have a 
persuasive impact on courts across the nation, and thus far, neither the trial court nor the 
appellate court has offered an analysis of the problem that is altogether persuasive.  In National 
Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor, the question before the Court is whether Michigan’s marriage 
amendment precludes the state from offering health care benefits to the domestic partners of its 
gay and lesbian employees.  Part Two will offer an extensive analysis of this case, given its 
significance in the current debate. 
 
II. National Pride at Work, Inc., et al. v. Governor of Michigan 
 
A. Backdrop 
 
Shortly after the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that same-sex marriage 
would be legal in its state, a member of the Michigan State Legislature proposed that a 
constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage be placed before the Michigan voters.61 
The proposed amendment failed, however, when it did not garner the required two-thirds 
majority.62 Soon thereafter, the Michigan Christian Citizen’s Alliance started an initiative 
committee in an effort to achieve the same end.63 This committee – Citizens for the Protection of 
Marriage – successfully collected more than 500,000 signatures on a petition demanding that the 
proposed amendment be placed on the November ballot.64 On November 2, 2004, voters in the 
                                                 
59
 See In re Utah State Retirement Board, No. 050916879 (Utah D. Ct. 2006), available at http: 
www.acluutah.org/normanruling.pdf.  Salt Lake City defined “Adult Designee” as “a [dependent] person, not the 
spouse of the employee, who has resided in the domicile of the eligible employee for not less tha[n] twelve 
consecutive months and intends to continue to do so, is at least eighteen years old, and is economically dependent on 
or interdependent with the eligible employee.”  See id. 
 
60
 See Brinkman v. Miami Univ., 2007 WL 2410390 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2007); see also Ralph v. City of New 
Orleans, No. 2003-09871, Civ. D. Ct. Parish of Orleans (Jan. 15, 2008); Nat’l Pride at Work v. Governor, 732 
N.W.2d 139 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (discussed infra Part II). 
61
 Wedding Wall: Balloted gay marriage ban denies equal protection, The Michigan Daily, July 6, 2004, 
http://media.www.michigandaily.com/media/storage/paper851/news/2004/07/06/Opinioneditorials/Wedding.Wall-
1424382.shtml (last visited on November 12, 2007) (hereinafter “Wedding Wall”). 
62
 See id. 
63
 See Plaintiff-Appellant’s Brief on Appeal, State of Michigan (Supreme Court) (hereinafter “Plaintiff’s Brief”), 
dated August 30, 2007, at 7. 
64
 See Chris Killian, Michigan Split on Marriage Proposal, October 14, 2004, at 
http://media.www.westernherald.com/media/storage/paper881/news/2004/10/14/News/Michigan.Split.On.Marriage.
Proposal-2123912.shtml (last visited on November 12, 2007). The petition was quite successful – supporters needed 
only approximately 318,000 signatures in order to win a spot on the ballot.   
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state of Michigan passed the marriage amendment, which states as follows: “To secure and 
preserve the benefits of marriage for our society and for future generations of children, the union 
of one man and one woman in marriage shall be the only agreement recognized as a marriage or 
similar union for any purpose.”65 One of eleven same-sex marriage amendments to pass 
nationwide that day, Michigan’s amendment was approved by 59% of the voters.66  It was a clear 
victory for same-sex marriage opponents and an expected defeat for proponents of gay and 
lesbian rights.67 
Even though the language of the Michigan amendment is somewhat opaque, its primary 
purpose is simple and straightforward – voters intended to eliminate the68 possibility of same-sex 
marriage in the state of Michigan.69  More ambiguous, however, is the exact import of the 
“similar union” language.  Voters certainly meant to block the creation of civil unions, their 
functional equivalent, or any other publicly cognizable union between an unmarried couple that 
was similar the marital union.70  Nevertheless, the contours of the prohibition are unclear.  Did 
the ban extend only to the creation of comprehensive parallel regimes like those in Vermont, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, California, and Oregon, each one of which allows gay and lesbian 
residents to enter into publicly-acknowledged relationships that are treated like marriage under 
state law?71  Or did it also extend to the creation of regimes like those in Washington, Hawaii, 
Maine, and the District of Columbia, where gay and lesbian relationships receive limited public 
acknowledgement and protection under state law?72  Would it negatively impact the ability of 
gay and lesbian couples to adopt or foster children?73  Would it limit the ability of gay and 
straight unmarried couples to receive protection under the domestic violence statutes?74  
Questions regarding the scope of the “similar union” language had an immediate practical 
impact in Michigan. Many state employers at the time of passage had policies or contractual 
                                                 
65
 See Mich. Const. art. I, § 25 (2004). 
66
 See Protect Our Families Michigan, at http://protectmifamilies.org/teir.php?page=21 (last visited on November 
12, 2007). 
67
 Dawson Bell, Proprosal 2: Gay Marriage Ban Easily Wins in State, Elsewhere; Constitutional Amendment Has 
Strong Support Across the Board, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 3, 2004, at 9A.   
68
 See id. (”Michigan was one of 11 states to adopt constitutional amendments on marriage, signaling a strong 
grassroots reaction to court decisions permitting same-sex marriage in Massachusetts and decisions by local officials 
in various places to permit gay and lesbian couples to marry.”). 
69
 See id. 
70
 See id. 
71
 See supra n. 24. 
72
 See supra n. 23. 
73
 See Danielle Epstein & Lena Mukherjee, Note, Constitutional Analysis of the Barriers Same-Sex Couples Face in 
Their Quest to Become a Family Unit, 12 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT 782, 800 (1997) (arguing that a  
significant consequence of failing to recognize same-sex marriage is the denial of benefits reserved for legally 
married couples, including the right to adopt and raise a family). 
74
 See infra, Part III (discussing the experience of the Ohio courts when evaluating this question). 
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agreements in place which offered health-care benefits to the domestic partners of gay and 
lesbian employees.75  The passage of the amendment seemed to render doubtful the continued 
validity of those policies and agreements. One such proposed agreement existed between 
Michigan’s Office of State Employer (“OSE”) and its employees who were represented by the 
United Auto Workers (“UAW”) union. On October 24, 2004, OSE and UAW entered into a 
tentative agreement that, for the first time, included health care and family medical leave benefits 
for the same-sex domestic partners of UAW members.76  In order to qualify for the benefits, 
however, the domestic partners had to meet certain eligibility criteria laid out in the Letter of 
Understanding between the OSE and the UAW.  The eligibility criteria were as follows: 
 
(1) Be at least 18 years of age. 
(2) Share a close personal relationship with the employee and be responsible for 
each other’s common welfare. 
(3) Not have a similar relationship with any other person, and not have had a 
similar relationship with any other person for the prior six months. 
(4) Not be a member of the employee’s immediate family as defined as 
employee’s spouse, children, parents, grandparents, or foster parents, 
grandchildren, parents-in-law, brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles or cousins. 
(5) Be of the same gender. 
(6) Have jointly shared the same regular and permanent residence for at least six 
months, and have an intent to continue doing so indefinitely. 
(7) Be jointly responsible for basic living expenses, including the cost of food, 
shelter and other common expenses of maintaining a household. This joint 
responsibility need not mean that the persons contribute equally or in any 
particular ratio, but rather that the persons agree that they are jointly 
responsible.77 
 
After the passage of the Marriage Amendment, OSE and UAW became especially concerned 
about the legality of the proposed agreement.78  Rather than submitting the proposed agreement 
to the Civil Service Commission for ratification, OSE and the UAW agreed to delay their 
submission until a court held that the proposed contract was legal.79  
                                                 
75
 For example, Michigan State University, prior to June 2007, offered health insurance benefits to employees in 
same-sex domestic partnerships.  See Colleen Maxwell, Michigan University Stops Same-Sex Benefits, June 6, 2007 
at http://www.afamichigan.org/2007/06/08/state-news-michigan-state-university-stops-same-sex-benefits/ (last 
visited Feb. 28th, 2008). 
76
 See Brief of Amici Curiae Internat’l Union, UAW and Its Local 6000 in Support of [P]laintiffs-Appellants, in the 
Supreme Court, dated August 13, 2007, at 1. 
77
 See id., Ex. 2, Letter of Understanding, Article 43, Section C (dated December 3, 2004) (hereinafter “Letter of 
Understanding”). 
78
 See id. at 1-2. 
79
 See supra n. 22, Letter of Understanding (outlining the criteria which established eligible dependency for same-
sex domestic partners and describing the parties’ intent to postpone ratification of the agreement until a court 
declared that the agreement did not violate the Marriage Amendment). 
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The proposed agreement between the OSE and UAW was not the only contract that was 
potentially threatened by the open-ended language of the amendment.  Despite public 
reassurances provided by its backers that the proposed amendment would not threaten benefit 
plans,80 it was nonetheless clear that the ambiguous language did, in fact, raise important 
questions about the full effect of the amendment.  Specific concerns were raised about the 
validity of plans implemented by state universities, with a particular emphasis on the University 
of Michigan, as well as plans implemented by localities like the City of Kalamazoo.81   
The policy implemented by the University of Michigan came under scrutiny as questions 
about the viability of these partner benefit plans became more intense.82  The university defended 
its plan as necessary to attract the kind of intellectual talent that supported the continued strength 
of its reputation for excellence, and argued that the voters did not intend to restrict its ability to 
offer these plans when they supported the amendment.83 Under the terms of the university’s 
benefit plan, a same-sex domestic partner meets the eligibility requirements if the following 
criteria are met:  the person was (1) of the same sex as the employee; (2) unmarried; (3) 
unrelated by blood to the employee in a manner that would have precluded marriage if the option 
was available; (4) uncovered by the university’s plan (i.e. cannot be a university employee); (5) 
registered as the employee’s domestic partner in their particular locality; (6) more than six 
months away from the termination of a previous domestic partner relationship with another 
person.84  
Similarly, the City of Kalamazoo implemented a plan in 2000 which offered health care 
benefits to all employees and their domestic partners.85  Individuals qualified as domestic 
partners under the City of Kalamazoo’s plan if they met the following requirements: (1) were of 
the same gender; (2) were at least 18 years and had the mental competence to enter into a 
contract; (3) were sharing and had shared a common residence for at least six months; (4) were 
unmarried and were not related in a manner that would have precluded them from marrying 
under the Michigan statutes; (5) shared their finances and living expenses; and (6) had signed a 
                                                 
80
 A representative of Citizens for the Protection of Marriage, which sponsored the initiative resulting in the 
placement of the marriage amendment on the ballot, described the impact of the proposed amendment for the 
Michigan Board of Canvassers, which was responsible for certifying the ballot proposal. See Plaintiff-Appellant’s 
Brief on Appeal, dated August 30, 2007, at 7. He argued that the amendment would not “preclude the public 
employer from extending . . . benefits, if they so chose, as a matter of contract between employer and employee. . . 
.” Id. at 8.  
81
 See Nat’l Pride at Work v. Granholm, 2005 WL 3048040 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Sept. 27, 2005), at **1-2 (describing the 
structure of the health-benefit plan implemented by defendant City of Kalamazoo, as well as a similar plan 
implemented by the University of Michigan). 
82
 Even though it is not a party to the National Pride at Work litigation, the University of Michigan’s plan was 
analyzed by both the trial court and the court of appeals. [cite]  
83
 See Brief of the Regents of the University of Michigan, the Board of Governors of Wayne State University, Central 
Michigan Board of Trustees, the Board of Control of Northern Michigan University, Michigan Technological 
University, Saginaw Valley State University, and the Board of Regents of Eastern Michigan University as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellants, in the Supreme Court of Michigan, dated August 24, 2007, at 3, 20. 
84
 See id. Ex. 1, p. 3. 
85
 See id. at *1. 
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Certification of Domestic Partnership.86 Currently, the city is a defendant in the National Pride 
at Work litigation and is defending the constitutionality of its benefit plan. 
Shortly after the passage of the amendment, the plan offered by the City of Kalamazoo 
inspired State Representative Jacob W. Hoogendyk, Jr. to seek an attorney general opinion 
regarding its constitutionality.  Michael Cox, the Michigan Attorney General, concluded that 
“the City’s policy of offering benefits to same-sex domestic partners violates the amendment’s 
prohibition against recognizing any ‘similar union’ other than the union of one man and woman 
in marriage.”87  In his opinion, the Attorney General identified the purpose of the amendment as 
protecting the “social, legal, and financial benefits [of marriage] uniquely [for] married men and 
women.”88 Viewing the rest of the amendment in light of this purpose, he concluded that the 
language was “best interpreted as prohibiting the acknowledgement of both same-sex 
relationships and unmarried opposite-sex relationships.”89  Since the City of Kalamazoo arguably 
granted formally-registered domestic partners a status that was similar to marriage, tying the 
receipt of benefits to an employee’s status as one half of a domestic partnership was a 
“recognition or acknowledgement of the validity of . . . same-sex relationships.”90  As such, the 
policy violated the amendment.91  On April 18, 2005, the City of Kalamazoo announced its 
intention to discontinue the benefits plan, effective January 1, 2006, unless a court ruled that the 
policy was legal.92  Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs filed their action in National Pride at Work. 
 
B. National Pride at Work – Trial Court decision 
 
The trial court in National Pride at Work described the question before it as follows: 
“[W]hether a public employer may voluntarily, either through the collective bargaining process 
or otherwise, agree to provide its employees with so-called “same sex benefits.”93  The benefits 
at issue were primarily health-care benefits meant to cover the domestic partner of the employee 
in question.94  Benefits programs offered by defendant City of Kalamazoo, as well as the State of 
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 See id. at *2. 
87
 Opinion No. 7171, Office of the Attorney General, State of Michigan, 2005 WL 639112 (March 16, 2005). 
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 Id. (emphasis added). 
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 See id. The Attorney General also found that the prohibition contained in the amendment operated prospectively 
only. Therefore, contracts which were already in existence prior to the effective date of the amendment would not be 
impacted. See id. 
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 See Nat’l Pride at Work v. Granholm, 2005 WL 3048040 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Sept. 27, 2005), at *2. 
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 Id., at *1. The question addressed by the trial court actually mischaracterized the true issue – the impact of the 
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 See id. 
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Michigan95 and the University of Michigan, served as illustrative examples for purposes of the 
court’s analysis.  
 The trial court grounded its analysis in the rules governing constitutional interpretation in 
the state of Michigan. The most significant rules guiding the court’s analysis were the direction 
to “give[] [the words] their plain meaning at the time of ratification,” and to implement “[t]he 
meaning . . . which realizes the intent of the people who ratified the Constitution.”96  Courts were 
certainly allowed to consider the circumstances surrounding adoption when the language was 
ambiguous, but in this case, the language was sufficiently clear to avoid resort to extrinsic 
evidence of the voters’ intent.97  
 The trial court identified the very first phrase of the amendment – “to secure and 
preserve the benefits of marriage for our society and for future generations of children” – as 
support for its claim that the voters had clearly stated their intent. 98 According to the trial court, 
the opening language of the amendment evinced the overriding purpose of preserving the 
statutory benefits of marriage – benefits which did not include a guarantee of health care.99  
Individuals did not receive health-care benefits as a matter of statutory right as soon as they were 
married; rather, the receipt of health-care benefits was simply a function of the employment 
relationship:  “If a spouse receives health care benefits, it is a result of a contractual provision or 
policy directive of the employer.”100  The circumstances under which these benefits were 
dispensed were not governed by the creation and implementation of legal rules.  Rather, 
eligibility for the receipt of these benefits depended entirely on the employees’ ability to meet 
the criteria established by their respective employers.101  
 After interpreting the opening language of the amendment in this manner, it appeared that 
there was nothing left to decide.  If the “benefits” described in the amendment referred only to 
the statutory benefits that arose as a consequence of marriage, and if health-care benefits did not 
fall into that category, then presumably the state employee plans were not covered by the terms 
of the amendment. The trial court, however, did not end its analysis here.  Focusing on the word 
“recognize,” the court next considered the meaning of the second major phrase in the 
amendment: “the union of one man and one woman in marriage shall be the only agreement 
recognized as a marriage or similar union.”102  The Michigan Attorney General argued that the 
state “recognized” a union by acknowledging its existence and premising the receipt of benefits 
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 The benefits provided by the State of Michigan that are described here refer only to those benefits that were 
negotiated with the UAW. See Nat’l Pride at Work, 2005 WL 3048040, * 2. 
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 Id. at *3 (citations omitted).  
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 See id. at **3-4. 
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 See id. 
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 Id. at *4. 
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 Id. 
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 See id. 
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 See Nat’l Pride at Work, 2005 WL 3048040, at *4. 
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on its existence.103 Plaintiff National Pride at Work, on the other hand, argued that “recognition” 
of a relationship would require the state, as a sovereign entity, to bestow a formal status on a 
non-marital union or offer individuals in such unions guaranteed rights.104  Since the employee 
benefit plans did not accomplish either end, there was no “recognition” within the meaning of the 
amendment.105 
The trial court, however, declined to take either approach suggested by the parties.  
Instead, it chose a third approach – it proposed to interpret “recognize” in light of the purpose 
animating the specific provision within which the word was contained.  Once again, the purpose 
of this section of the amendment was apparent on the face of the amendment:  to ensure that 
“only a union between one man and one woman [would] be recognized ‘as a marriage or similar 
union.’”106  In an ostensible effort to effectuate this purpose, the trial court asked whether the 
eligibility criteria themselves, rather than the state’s decision to premise the receipt of benefits on 
meeting these criteria, recognized a marriage or a similar union.107  After quickly dispensing with 
the notion that recognition of marriage was at stake, the trial court further concluded that the 
criteria did not, in fact, recognize a similar union.108  As an initial matter, no union arose from 
the criteria.109 Moreover, the criteria differed from employer to employer, providing yet another 
basis for failing to find any recognition within the meaning of the amendment.110  Finally, the 
trial court argued that “the criteria could not be said to create a union where one [did] not exist 
according to law.”111  
Even if the criteria had “recognized” a union, the trial court would have held that they did 
not recognize a union “similar to marriage.”112  Once again relying on an understanding of 
marriage that was rooted in the statutory regime that defined the duties and benefits of marriage, 
the trial court argued that the eligibility criteria for health-care benefits established by the state 
employers “pale[d] in comparison to the myriad . . . legal rights and responsibilities accorded to 
those with marital status.”113  Comparison of the specific statutory rights and duties that arise 
through marriage, as well as the method of termination and the legal consequences that flow 
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from the end of a marriage, persuaded the court that no union similar to marriage was implicated 
by the health-care benefits programs: 
 
The criteria in the present case do not come close to approaching the legal status 
that marriage holds in our society. The relationship between the employee and the 
covered dependent, not being defined by law, is left to the parties to define 
privately. The criteria neither reflect that nor recognize that. The criteria define 
eligibility for health insurance benefits and do not act as recognition of a union 
similar to marriage. 114 
 
Ultimately, the trial court held that the marriage amendment did not apply to the state 
employer health-care benefit plans. Therefore, state employers were not barred by the 
amendment from offering partner benefits to their unmarried employees.115 
 
C. National Pride at Work – Court of Appeals decision 
 
The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed.  Framing the question before it in slightly 
different manner, the Court of Appeals considered “[w]hether a public employer’s extension of 
employment benefits, e.g., same-sex domestic-partnership benefits, [was] based on an agreement 
recognized as a marriage or similar union. . . .” 116  If it was, then the benefits were invalid: 
“The operative language of the amendment plainly precludes the extension of benefits related to 
an employment contract if the benefits are conditioned on or provided because of an agreement 
recognized as a marriage or similar union.”117  Thus, even though both courts were ultimately 
focused on the authority of state employers to act in the way that they did, the Court of Appeals 
question was more precisely attuned to the central debate that was pending before it. 
This difference between the two opinions notwithstanding, both courts began at the same 
analytical starting place. Much like the trial court, the Court of Appeals opened the substantive 
portion of its analysis by identifying the primary rules of constitutional interpretation on which 
Michigan courts rely.118 Also, much like the trial court, the Court of Appeals found that the 
“mandate” of the amendment was clear: “that only one ‘agreement’ – the union of one man and 
one woman in marriage – may be recognized as a marriage or similar union for any purpose.”119  
In doing so, however, the Court of Appeals dismissed the trial court’s view that the amendment’s 
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 See id. at ** 6-7. 
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statement of purpose – “to secure and preserve the benefits of marriage” – was effectively 
identical to its mandate.120  
Central to the court’s analysis was the meaning of the word “recognize.”  The court held 
that “the common understanding of the term ‘recognize’ as used in the amendment is [meant] in 
a legal sense, i.e., to acknowledge the validity of something.”121 The question, then, was whether 
the policy in question acknowledged the validity of a relationship similar to marriage when it 
premised partner eligibility for health-care benefits on the existence of a close, personal 
relationship.  The court made two analytical moves here: (1) it considered whether the 
requirement that the couples be in a domestic partnership of some sort demonstrated that an 
“agreement” was at stake, and (2) it compared domestic partnerships to marriage. Insofar as 
“agreements” were concerned, the Court of Appeals noted that “the employee and the 
employee’s eligible dependent must have agreed to be jointly responsible for basic living 
expenses and other common expenses of maintaining a household.”122  The court went on to note 
the following:  “Upon being advised of the existence of the employer-required agreement, the 
employer is contractually, i.e., legally, obligated to recognize the agreement for the purpose of 
providing health-care benefits to the dependent.”123  Under the terms of these policies, then, the 
public entity acquired a legally enforceable obligation upon proof that the employee and his or 
her partner had agreed to embrace a relationship that the marriage amendment had arguably 
rendered invisible to the law.124  
The state’s acknowledgement of the agreement was meaningless, though, if the 
agreement was not similar to marriage. In order to evaluate this issue, it was necessary for the 
court to have an understanding of what marriage meant, and then to measure domestic 
partnerships against that understanding. Starting with the definition of marriage, the court found 
that the institution was defined by the Michigan Code as “a unique relationship between a man 
and a woman . . . . [that the] state has a special interest in encouraging, supporting, and 
protecting . . . in order to promote, among other goals, the stability and welfare of society and its 
children.”125  Myriad rights, responsibilities, benefits, and privileges were available to and 
imposed upon married couples as they entered an institution that was simultaneously private, 
public and social in its conception: 
 
Marriage is a civil contract, but it is not a pure private contract. It is affected with 
a public interest and by a public policy. The status of children, preservation of the 
home, private morality, public decency, and the like afford ample grounds for 
special treatment of marriage as a contract, by statute and decision. In recognition 
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 Id. at 151. 
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of its public and social nature, courts have cast about it the protecting mantle of 
presumptions, sustaining validity of marriage, said to be the strongest known to 
the law.126 
 
Even though domestic partnership agreements did not carry with them the same social caché or 
legal significance, and further, did not give rise to the same welter of rights and responsibilities, 
they were nonetheless similar in certain crucial ways to marriage.  First of all, domestic 
partnership agreements were created in order to “proclaim the existence of the relationship by 
establishing a mechanism for the public expression, sanction, and documentation of the 
commitment.”127  Second, the entry requirements for the domestic partnership agreements in the 
record were comparable to those for marriage: (1) there was a gender requirement; (2) there was 
a need for the consent of the parties to the relationship; (3) there was a need to prove that the 
parties were not blood relations; (4) there was a need to ensure that no marriages are similar 
relationships existed for either of the parties; and (5) there was a minimum age requirement.128  
In light of these similarities, the trial court erred when it held that the prohibition of the 
amendment did not apply to the benefit plans that were at issue here. 
 
D. Critique of the Analyses Employed by the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals 
 
1. Trial Court Critique 
 
Even though the trial court reached a result that was vitally important for a minority 
population in the state, the manner in which it reached the result created more problems than it 
solved. The trial court began its analysis by asking the right question: “[W]hether a public 
employer may voluntarily, either through the collective bargaining process or otherwise, agree to 
provide its employees with so-called ‘same-sex benefits.’”129  It ran into difficulty, though, when 
it began to interpret the meaning of the word “recognize.” 
As it began its analysis of “recognize,” the court noted the different positions taken by the 
plaintiffs and the Attorney General. The plaintiffs argued that the word “refer[red] to the State of 
Michigan [i]n its sovereignty conferring some status or rights on the union.”130 By way of 
contrast, the Attorney General argued that “the word ‘recognize’ [meant] acknowledg[ing] the 
existence of something and that any benefit at all that is provided to a same-sex union would 
acknowledge the existence of that union.”131 Rejecting both approaches, the trial court instead 
opted not to define the word at all. 
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Rather than offering a straightforward meaning of the word that could be applied to the 
facts before the court, the trial court argued that “[n]either the common meaning of recognize nor 
examination of that word in isolation allow[ed] for a determination of the intended meaning.”132  
It was necessary to look at both the definitional sense of the word, as well as the underlying 
purpose which animated the provision in which the word was found.133  Looking at the 
provision, the court found that it was unambiguous: “The provision requires that only a union 
between one man and one woman will be recognized ‘as a marriage or a similar union.’” Clearly, 
the benefits in question were not based on marriage, so the question was whether “the criteria 
act[ed] as recognition of ‘a union similar to marriage.’”134  
The court answered this question by focusing on whether or not a union arose from or 
was created by the designated criteria; if a union had arisen from the criteria, one could then say 
that the state had recognized a status.  The court made three arguments: (1) no union arose from 
the criteria themselves because they did nothing more than establish eligibility for receiving the 
benefits; (2) no union arose from the criteria because they differed by employer; thereby 
negating the possibility of public recognition of a status, and (3) no union was created by the 
criteria because one could not create a union where one did not exist according to law.135   
The court’s analysis in this case was somewhat problematic.  As an initial matter, both 
the plaintiffs and the Attorney General offered reasonable definitions of the word “recognize,”136 
definitions that would encompass a union that did, in fact, “arise” from the stated criteria.  If a 
union did arise from the criteria designated by the state agency, then the state would have created 
a status for that relationship by establishing it formally within the law. Moreover, if a union arose 
from the criteria, the state would, by definition, be acknowledging it, precisely because it had 
created it.  The court, however, seemed to imply that recognition would occur only if the state 
gave these unions a formal status designation in the law, and nothing of the sort had happened 
here.137  This claim would have been more persuasive if the court had offered better arguments in 
support of it.138 
The analysis became substantially weaker with its second point – no union arose from the 
criteria because they differed by employer. The response to this argument is evident: the criteria 
in question need not be uniform in order for the union to exist, or for the union to be recognized 
by the state.  In fact, it is common for domestic partner plans to vary from employer to employer, 
but the fact of variance does not support a claim of non-recognition.  As will be discussed in 
greater detail, if a public employer confers a status on an individual, and if consequences are 
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triggered when the individual achieves that status, one can reasonably argue that the status has 
been recognized by the employer.139  This analysis of recognition does not depend on the 
uniformity of the criteria which confer the status; it merely depends on the action taken by the 
public employer itself.140  Again, if the court wished to offer an alternative account of the 
meaning of recognition, it needed to bolster the argument with more analysis than it offered in 
this case.  Finally, the last point raised was simply odd. The court argued that a union could not 
be created by the criteria if the union did not already exist.  If the purpose of the criteria was to 
create a union that would be formally recognized under the law, then presumably, the union was 
not already in existence.  If the union already existed, there would be no need to create the same 
union. The court’s analysis of the word “recognize” is largely unpersuasive. 
The court continued its unsatisfactory analysis when it turned to the meaning of the word 
“union.”  It suggested that the Attorney General’s argument – that the employers were 
recognizing “unions” because they turned on the existence of a “relationship” – was flawed 
because the plans were not entirely based on the existence of a relationship.141  The court 
acknowledged that the plans established by the state of Michigan and the University of Michigan 
did require proof of a relationship in order to establish eligibility for the benefits;142 nevertheless, 
it found that the existence of a relationship was not key because “the benefits terminate upon 
termination of employment even if a relationship between the parties continues.”143  Moreover, 
the existence of a relationship was only one requirement for eligibility – if other requirements 
were not met, the request for coverage would be denied.144  The plans simply allowed employers 
to provide voluntarily “health insurance benefits to those who [met] certain criteria that the 
employer [had] established.”145 
Even though the court’s reasoning is flimsy, its ultimate conclusion here is correct: 
merely providing health care benefits to a designated individual does not constitute recognition 
of a “union.” If the plans simply asked employees to designate a person to receive benefits, no 
one could reasonably argue that they violated the prohibition contained in the marriage 
amendment.  Of course, this is not what the plans did – the benefits at stake could be received 
only if the individual employees had “agreed” to live in relationships (or “unions”) that met the 
criteria defined by the employer. In fact, given the manner in which the plans operated, the state 
met the definitions of “recognize” offered by both the plaintiffs and the Attorney General: not 
only did the state recognize the relationships by explicitly acknowledging their existence, it 
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accorded them a certain amount of public significance by privileging their life choices over those 
of individuals who were not in relationships. A single person could not simply designate any 
individual to receive health care benefits under any of these regimes; instead, that single person 
would have to be in an unmarried relationship with either a man or a woman and meet the other 
requirements before designating a recipient for health insurance. 
The trial court, then, reached a conclusion that could not be supported under a reasonable 
interpretation of the marriage amendment.  This, of course, begs, an important question:  did the 
court of appeals fare any better? 
 
 
 
2. Critique of the Court of Appeals Opinion 
 
The logic employed by the Court of Appeals was far more straightforward than the 
analysis employed by the trial court. Nevertheless, analytical problems exist in this opinion, as 
well. As noted above, the Court of Appeals’ analysis began with its perceived “mandate” of the 
amendment – namely, that only an agreement between a man and a woman could be recognized 
as a marriage or a similar union.  By conceptualizing the mandate in this way, the court was 
eventually free to turn its focus to the nature of the agreement that was at stake. If the agreement 
was similar to marriage, and if the state “recognized” it within the meaning of the amendment, 
then the plans would have to fail. After finding that the plans “recognized” the agreements in a 
formal sense of the word, the court considered whether the plans violated the similarity provision 
of the amendment.  Given the similarity between the eligibility requirements under the state 
plans and the requirements for marriage, the court held that the amendment had been violated.146  
Moreover, the recognition by the state granted “a same-sex couple the ability to hold themselves 
out as a publicly recognized monogamous couple, i.e. a union.”147  The couples’ abilities to hold 
themselves out as a publicly recognized union meaningfully distinguished them from people who 
were simply dating – even if there were limited privileges that flowed from the decision to enter 
into this public agreement, the fact that the state offered a method through which public 
acknowledgement might occur manifestly created a new a status for these couples.  As such, 
these couples were “similar” in some sense to married people.   
Even though the analysis offered by the Court of Appeals is clean and arguably 
persuasive, the interpretive methodology that it used was flawed.  The question of “similarity” is 
far more complex than the Court of Appeals was willing to credit, and the court should have 
offered a more searching rationale in support of its conclusion that the domestic partnership 
agreements that were recognized by the state actually violated the amendment.  “Similar” is a 
word whose meaning is rather flexible:  two things might be similar if they have one element in 
common, if they have some elements in common, or if they have every element in common.  
Rather than exploring the ambiguity that is inherent in this word, the court simply found that the 
similarity between the eligibility criteria for marriage and the domestic partner plans was 
sufficient to violate the amendment. 
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Even though there were problems in the analytical approaches taken by both the trial 
court and the court of appeals, they were essentially working in a vacuum.  The marriage 
amendments have not been subject to sustained critical analysis yet, so it is not clear how these 
terms should be interpreted.  Part III will address this problem by offering an interpretive guide 
that future courts might follow if presented with similar concerns. 
 
 
III. Interpreting Critical Terms and Concepts in the Comparative Model MSAs –“Status,” 
“Recognition,” and “Identical/Similar” 
 
 A. Understanding Status and Recognition 
   
 The Comparative Model MSAs forbid the validation or recognition of any status 
designation for unmarried individuals that is identical to, identical or substantially similar to, or 
similar to marriage.148  Courts in these states will almost certainly have to interpret these 
provisions at some point in the future, and their analyses will likely begin with a focus on the 
meanings of “status” and “recognition.”149  Although these terms appear frequently in the law, 
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they are nevertheless seldom defined, largely because their meanings are generally viewed as 
understood.  
Given the manner in which the term “status” is often used, it makes sense that courts and 
commentators have not felt pressured to define the term standing alone.  Rather frequently, the 
word “status” is used in conjunction with a modifier, and this word may have greater 
significance to the resolution of a dispute.  By way of example, under federal law, merit system 
principles governing executive branch employees grant workers a right to “fair and equitable 
treatment in all aspects of personnel management without regard to … marital status.”150  
Therefore, if an executive branch employee claimed discrimination on the basis of marital status, 
the reviewing court would focus its attention on any evidence suggesting that a decision maker 
had used the employee’s status as single, married, divorced, or widowed to deny him or her 
certain benefits or opportunities.  Since an individual might conceivably embody many different 
status designations under law, it is necessary to define the status which triggers a set of legal 
consequences. 
Standing in isolation, then, the concept of “status” is broad and abstract.  Professor Jack 
Balkin has offered a more precise calibration of the term by arguing that “status” refers to those 
“characteristic[s] of an individual that [have] some legal consequences.”151  He distinguishes 
legal status from sociological status, noting that “lawyers usually understand legal status as a 
feature of individuals and their relationships to the law . . . [while sociological status] is 
concerned about social structure:  [i]t is concerned with competition and hierarchy among social 
collectivities.”152  Balkin’s view of status is echoed by Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines 
status as “[t]he rights, duties, capacities and incapacities which determine a person to a given 
class.”153  Similarly, the Oxford Dictionary of Current English notes that status is “the official 
classification given to someone or something.”154  Viewing these definitions in concert with each 
other suggests that legal status refers to a set of characteristics that define an individual’s 
membership in an official class, as a consequence of which rights, duties, capacities and/or 
incapacities are acquired.   
Each body of law – statutory law, common law, constitutional law, and regulatory law, as 
well as judicial interpretations of these bodies of law – identifies the status designations that are 
operative within it.  These bodies of law contain multiple categories of classification, and 
establishing the criteria for membership in those categories will result in some form of legal 
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consequence.  A person who participated in Nazi persecution during World War II, for instance, 
becomes a member of the category defined as “deportable;”155 in certain jurisdictions, an 
entrant’s status as an invitee, licensee, or trespasser will determine the scope of a landowner’s 
duty of care toward him or her;156 if a territory acquires wetland status, certain unique 
administrative duties will subsequently be imposed on the Natural Resources Conservation 
Service.157  Many other examples of status designations exist throughout the law. 
Acquiring a status designation, however, is simply a precondition for triggering legal 
consequences; it is through the process of recognition that the consequences actually manifest.  
Therefore, when evaluating the Comparative Model MSAs, one must examine “status” and 
“recognition” in conjunction with each other.  Much like the idea of “status,”  “recognition” is a 
critical term that often appears in the law, but is rarely defined.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
recognition as “[r]atification; confirmation; an acknowledgment that something done by another 
person in one’s name had one’s authority.”158  Similarly, at least one federal court has found that 
recognize means “to acknowledge by admitting to a privileged status.”159   
The confusion generated by the meaning of the ambiguous terms used in the marriage 
amendments, including term “recognize,” inspired constituents in a number of states to seek 
opinions from their Attorneys General regarding the likely validity of proposed or existing plans 
that offered benefits to gay and lesbian citizens.160  The Attorney General of Kentucky, for 
instance, was asked to consider whether that state’s marriage amendment precluded a public 
university from offering health insurance coverage to the domestic partners of its employees.161  
After considering the application of “recognize” in various contexts and its analysis by different 
courts, the Attorney General concluded, “whenever the government causes a benefit to depend 
upon a status, the status is ‘recognized.’”162  Broadly speaking, then, “recognition” occurs when 
a legal consequence flows from acquiring a status that is officially defined. 
Ultimately, states that are called upon to interpret their amendments are unlikely to 
encounter great difficulty when they define the concepts of “status” and “recognition.”  
Moreover, they are likely to find that any analysis of the relationship between the two is equally 
undemanding.  Rather, interpretive problems are most likely to arise over the application of the 
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terms to the circumstances at issue.  This prediction finds support in the Ohio courts.  Ohio’s 
marriage amendment states as follows:  
 
Only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid in or 
recognized by this state and its political subdivisions. This state and its political 
subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal status for relationships of 
unmarried individuals that intends to approximate the design, qualities, 
significance or effect of marriage.163 
 
Litigation over the amendment focused on the potential conflict between the second sentence and 
the application of the domestic violence statute to unmarried individuals. Unmarried defendants 
could be prosecuted under the statute upon proof that they were “living as . . . spouse[s]” with 
the complainant.  After the passage of the marriage amendment, defendants in these cases argued 
that the designation of “living as a spouse” recognized a legal status for unmarried people in 
violation of the amendment.164  The lower courts in Ohio were split regarding the validity of the 
claim, but the Ohio Supreme Court resolved it against the defendants in Ohio v. Carswell.  This 
resolution of the debate turned significantly on the court’s understanding of “status” and the 
manner in which it applied to the domestic violence statute. 
 
1. Ohio v. Carswell: The Meaning and Application of “Status” 
 
Since 1979, Ohio’s domestic violence laws have protected unmarried individuals who 
were victimized at the hands of a cohabiting intimate partner.165  Unmarried, cohabiting partners 
are protected under these laws by virtue of the manner in which “family or household member” 
has been defined, both by statute and by the Ohio Supreme Court.  The domestic violence statute 
states as follows: “No person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to a 
family or household member.”166 The statute goes on to define “family or household member” as 
covering a number of different relationship categories, including “[a] person living as a 
spouse.”167  This category is further defined as referring to “a person who is living or has lived 
with the offender in a common law marital relationship, who otherwise is cohabiting with the 
offender, or who otherwise has cohabited with the offender within five years prior to the date of 
the alleged commission of the act in question.”168  The domestic violence statutes do not define 
“cohabitation,” but in State v. Williams, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “the essential 
elements of ‘cohabitation’ are (1) sharing of familial or financial responsibilities and (2) 
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consortium. . . . Possible factors establishing shared familial or financial responsibilities might 
include provisions for shelter, food, clothing, utilities, and/or commingled assets. Factors that 
might establish consortium include mutual respect, fidelity, affection, society, cooperation, 
solace, comfort, aid of each other, friendship, and conjugal relations.”169 Carswell presented the 
Ohio Supreme Court with an opportunity to consider whether the application of these principles 
to an unmarried defendant in a domestic violence case “create[d] or recognize[d] a legal status 
for relationships of unmarried individuals that intend[ed] to approximate the design, qualities, 
significance or effect of marriage.”170 
The Court’s substantive discussion of the issue began with its definition of the phrase 
“legal status.” After examining several dictionary definitions, the Court settled on a view of 
status which focused on two ideas:  (1) a person’s standing before the law, and (2) the degree to 
which this standing created “certain legal rights, duties, and liabilities.”171  Based on this 
understanding, the Court interpreted the operative phrase of the amendment – “[t]his state . . . 
shall not create or recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends 
to approximate the design, qualities, significance, or effect of marriage” – as meaning that “the 
state cannot create or recognize a legal status for unmarried persons that bears all of the 
attributes of marriage – a marriage substitute.”172 This definition reflected the Court’s view of 
the purpose of the amendment, which was to prevent the state from creating or recognizing a 
parallel marriage regime, like civil unions.173  
The Court then turned to the meaning of the “family or household” provision in the 
domestic violence statute.  In the Court’s view, this term did nothing more than create a class of 
potential victims to whom the law offered its protection.  Beyond that, the statute did not create 
any new rights, privileges or benefits for individuals who were subject to the “family or 
household member” provision.174  Finally, the state did not create the relationship of 
cohabitation; the cohabiting couples established this state of affairs themselves.175  Since the 
state played no role in creating the relationship, it could not be deemed to create or recognize any 
status in violation of the amendment.176  The phrase “living as a spouse” simply “identifi[ed] a 
particular class of persons for purposes of the domestic-violence statutes.”177   
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2. Critiquing the Account of Status Offered by the Carswell Court 
 
The analysis of “status” employed by the Ohio Supreme Court was problematic for two 
reasons: (1) it limited the scope of the amendment’s authority in a manner that was flatly 
inconsistent with its language by holding that the only legal status prohibited by the amendment 
was a marriage substitute bearing all of the attributes of marriage; and (2) by holding that the 
phrase “living as a spouse” did nothing more than identify a class of victims, the Court failed to 
account for the fact that everyone who was covered by the provision acquired either a set of 
rights or a set of liabilities by virtue of the designation.  The former objection is a straightforward 
one:  if the amendment drafters had intended such a narrow scope for the amendment, they could 
easily have crafted a provision which prohibited the state from creating or recognizing a legal 
status “for relationships of unmarried individuals that replicates the design, qualities, 
significance or effect of marriage,” or was “equivalent to the design, qualifies, significance or 
effect of marriage.”  The drafters could have used any number of terms to limit the amendment 
in precisely the way suggested by the Court, and yet, they did not.  One might argue in response 
that the intent of the framers is not the most important consideration, but rather, that the intent of 
the voters should guide the Court’s analysis.178  Assuming that one could support the position, 
one might further argue that all available evidence shows that the narrowing construction applied 
by the Court was consistent with the voters’ understanding of the amendment.  In fact, Ohio law 
specifically allows courts to adduce extrinsic evidence of voter intent when interpreting 
ambiguous provisions of the state constitution.179  The provision of the amendment that was 
examined in Carswell is inarguably ambiguous; why, then, did the Court avoid this 
methodological approach when it reached this conclusion?  Obviously, there is no answer to this 
question, but if the majority’s conclusion was based on a clear sense of what the voters intended, 
it should have expressly said so.180  
  The latter objection proposed above is clearly in the minority position – only a relative 
handful of the lower courts in Ohio reached this conclusion,181 and only one member of the Ohio 
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Supreme Court dissented on these grounds.  Nonetheless, their analyses of “status” were logical 
and direct, and barring a stronger argument to the contrary, should have prevailed in the majority 
opinion.  As noted above, the domestic violence statute provides that, “No person shall 
knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to a family or household member.”182 
“Family or household member” is subsequently defined with reference to those persons who are 
“living as . . . spouse[s];” a couple lives as spouses if they cohabit; and finally, “cohabitation” is 
defined as including a variety of characteristics, among them sharing the financial 
responsibilities of daily family life and consortium.183  If one follows the methodology of the 
majority – namely, analyzing the language of the amendment and the language of the domestic 
violence statute rather than relying on any extrinsic evidence of voter intent – it becomes 
abundantly clear that applying the domestic violence statute to unmarried individuals violates the 
terms of the amendment. 
The Carswell Court started its substantive analysis in the right place – with a focus on the 
meaning of “legal status.” Moreover, the Court’s definition of status reasonably focused on the 
consequences that flowed from attaining a particular “standing,” or “position,” before the law.184  
If one takes this definition seriously, it seems that a person would who acquired such “standing,” 
would have to possess a very particular set of characteristics.  If the person did not possess these 
characteristics, no legal consequences would flow.  Even the lower courts that found a violation 
of the amendment offered definitions of status that were consistent with the Carswell majority’s 
view.  In City of Cleveland v. Voies, for instance, the Municipal Court found that “[a]ny time the 
law carves out specific designations for a particular group of people to have specialized 
treatment, they are, in fact, conferring a legal status on them.”185  
At this point, however, the Carswell court made a significant error in its analysis: it failed 
to consider adequately the consequences of falling into the category of “living as spouses.”  
Couples in Ohio whose living arrangements can credibly be viewed as spouse-like in nature 
attain a status under the domestic violence statute because proof of the designation carries rights 
and liabilities.  An abusive partner is not merely subject to criminal liability under the assault 
statute; this person is also subject to the distinct penalties and restraints that flow from violating 
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the domestic violence statute:  “[s]pecial bail considerations, enhancement of penalties[,] and 
civil protection orders would no longer be available to cohabiting couples if the domestic 
violence statutes [were] determined to be unconstitutional as applied.”186  This argument was 
proposed by organizations that work with victims of domestic violence, and ironically, it proves 
the point:  but for the law’s designation of these couples as falling into the category of “living as 
spouses,” a defendant who engaged in domestic violence would be subject to the penalties for 
criminal assault, and nothing more.  The additional penalties provided under the domestic 
violence statute simply would not apply.  Ultimately, one might argue that the domestic violence 
statute has created a special duty to refrain from assaulting a cohabiting partner by premising 
unique liabilities on the fact of the relationship.  
If one views the statute from the perspective of the complainants, the individuals whose 
relationships with the defendants meet the relevant characteristics of those who “live as spouses” 
acquire certain rights under the domestic violence statute.  As an initial matter, attainment of this 
status grants both cohabiting partners the right to file charges against the other under the 
domestic violence statute.187  Moreover, the statute grants unmarried complainants who are 
living as spouses a right to seek temporary protection orders from a court upon filing a 
complaint.188  Additionally, if a police officer believes that an act of domestic violence has 
occurred between a couple that he or she reasonably believes is living as spouses, the putative 
defendant can be arrested in the absence of a warrant.189  An unmarried complainant, therefore, 
has a right to insist that such a detention take place.   
Thus, the Court erred when it held that the statute merely created a category of victims, 
and did not create any new status category.  The Court also erred when it held that no official 
recognition of the status occurred when prosecutors applied the domestic violence statute to 
individuals who fell into the contested category.  The domestic violence statute creates a 
framework within which unmarried individuals who are living as spouses have a special right to 
expect non-violence in their relationships, a right that is supported by the enhanced penalties that 
are imposed and the protections that are granted if that right is violated.  As such, the Court 
should have found that the domestic violence statute created a legal status that was recognized by 
prosecutors when they charged unmarried defendants under its provisions. 
 
B. Status, Recognition, and the Application of These Terms to Public Employers’ 
Domestic Partner Benefits Plans 
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The foregoing analysis of status begs an important question: does it translate into the 
employee benefits context?  Employees receive benefits from their employers, not as a matter of 
statute, but rather, as a matter of contract.  Moreover, eligibility for the benefits is based on 
criteria that are developed by the employer and differ from one employer to the next; they are not 
uniform, and they are not imposed by statute. Does the fact that these benefits are dispensed by 
contract alter the analysis of status that has been proposed thus far?  In other words, would a 
public employer in a Comparative Model MSA state violate the prohibition against recognizing a 
status if the purported status is nothing more than a collection of eligibility requirements? 
Status designations are not recognized only under formal legal circumstances, as when a 
judicial decision or a statute establishes the criteria that a particular individual must meet.  
Domestic partner benefit plans are actually a perfect example of how a status can be both 
conferred and recognized through the process of entering a contract.  Of course, some 
commentators would argue to the contrary.  They would maintain that these plans simply 
establish criteria that qualify a person to receive a benefit, and that no corresponding status has 
been recognized because the benefit is simply a byproduct of the employment relationship.190  
This analysis is correct as far as it goes, but it fails to appreciate one critical factor:  when the 
employee meets the criteria established under the contract (i.e., meets those characteristics that 
place him or her in a particular class), he or she not only acquires the benefits, but also acquires a 
corresponding right of enforcement if the employer fails to produce those benefits.  One 
commentator has described domestic partner benefits plans in similar terms: 
 
Recognition of the partnership and the corresponding status of “domestic partner” 
in business and government contexts [are] typically achieved upon conformity 
with certain definitional guidelines.  As with any non-standard regulation, specific 
criteria defining the elements of a domestic partnership will vary from entity to 
entity.  However, most definitions of domestic partnerships contain at least 
several common elements, including: (1) minimum time requirements that 
establish a committed relationship; (2) evidence of financial interdependence; (3) 
sharing a joint residence; (4) certain parameters of the relationship, such as 
exclusivity, no close blood relationship, and no current legal partner; and (5) 
naming the partner as a beneficiary of [a] life insurance [policy] or pension plan.  
These requirements are not the product of government regulation or subject to 
oversight, and therefore will surely continue to be modified as domestic partner 
status becomes more common.191 
 
Thus, a status is acquired upon meeting those requirements that are based on an evaluation of the 
employee’s intimate relationship with his or her partner, and recognition follows upon achieving 
that status. 
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 Applying “status” and “recognition” to a hypothetical example will serve to illustrate the 
manner in which these terms work.  John and Jason are males in their early-30s who have been 
involved in an exclusive, intimate relationship for more than two years.  They have been living 
together for the past eighteen months and it is their intention to continue living together 
indefinitely.  There is no blood relationship between them, and neither one has ever been married 
or in a registered domestic partnership with any other individual.  They have not married each 
other or been joined in a civil union because they live in a Comparative Model MSA state which 
forbids the establishment of such arrangements.  Nonetheless, prior to the passage of the 
amendment in their state, they signed an affidavit at City Hall which registered them as domestic 
partners under the local domestic partner registry.192  Finally, their economic lives are fully 
intertwined with the other:  John is an assistant professor of Political Science at the local public 
university, Jason is a violinist in the local symphony orchestra, and they use their combined 
income to pay for all of their personal and household expenses.   
In an effort to minimize the discrimination experienced by its gay and lesbian employees 
and increase its ability to recruit talented individuals, the Human Resources Office at John’s 
school has decided that it wants to implement a partner benefits program.  This program would 
extend health insurance coverage to the domestic partners of its gay and lesbian employees.  In 
order to qualify for coverage under the program, employees and their partners must meet the 
following criteria: 
 
(1) the parties must be at least 18 years old; 
(2) the parties must share a close, personal relationship with each other and must be 
jointly responsible for basic living expenses, including the cost of food, shelter, and 
the common expenses of maintaining a household; 
(3) the parties must not currently have a similar relationship with any other person, and 
they must not have had a similar relationship (including marriage) with any other 
person within the past twelve months; 
(4) the parties may not be a member of the other’s immediate family, defined as a spouse, 
child, parent, grandparent, grandchild, brother, sister, aunt, uncle, or cousin within the 
second degree; 
(5) the parties must be of the same gender 
(6) the parties must have shared the same regular and permanent residence for at least the 
past six months, and must intend to do so for the indefinite future; 
(7) the parties must be registered in the city as domestic partners. 
 
In this case, the local orchestra does not offer health insurance coverage, so John would like to 
cover Jason under his policy (currently, Jason does not have any other health insurance of his 
own).  Based on the foregoing, Jason obviously qualifies for coverage under the proposed partner 
benefits program.  If the program is implemented and he actually receives those benefits, can one 
argue that this public school – an entity of the state – has recognized a status for the couple in 
violation of the terms of the state’s marriage amendment? 
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 The answer here has to be “yes.”  Once it is established that John and Jason meet the 
criteria laid out by the school, they fall into the official classification of “eligible individual.”  
Moreover, the status of eligibility has been defined entirely with reference to the nature of the 
intimate relationship between them.  If Jason was simply John’s roommate, or if he was in the 
middle of divorce proceedings with his soon-to-be ex-wife, or if they had not registered as 
domestic partners with the city, Jason would not fall into the class of individuals who are eligible 
for coverage under the policy.  Even though the status designation has not been created by 
judicial action or set forth in a statute, the characteristics for acquiring the status nonetheless 
have been set by an arm of the state.  Furthermore, Jason’s acquisition of the status which arose 
after meeting the eligibility criteria triggers the state employer’s contractual promise to cover 
him under its health insurance program.  As such, Jason’s status has been recognized by the 
public employer.  A legal consequence has flowed from the official recognition of his eligible 
status – if the employer does not provide the benefits, John will have an action against his 
employer for breach of contract. 
 Of course, finding that an official status has been recognized by the state is only the first 
part of any analysis under the Comparative Model MSAs.  The next step is to examine whether 
the status recognized by the state is sufficiently similar to marriage to fall within the scope of 
prohibition laid out by the amendment.  The next section will consider this question in greater 
detail. 
 
 C. Understanding “Identical/Similar” 
 
While it is important for courts to resolve correctly the questions surrounding the 
meaning and application of “recognition” and “status,” challenges to these employee benefits 
plans will succeed or fail based on the degree of marital similarity that is prohibited by the 
amendment in question.  Among the Comparative Model MSAs, one state – Alabama – prohibits 
the recognition of a parallel union that is identical to marriage:  “A union replicating marriage of 
or between persons of the same sex . . . shall be considered and treated in all respects as having 
no legal force or effect in this state and shall not be recognized by this state as a marriage or 
other union replicating marriage.”193  Six states – Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, North Dakota, 
Utah, and Wisconsin – prohibit the recognition of parallel institutions that are identical or 
substantially similar to marriage.194   The remaining eight states – Idaho, Michigan, Nebraska, 
Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, and Virginia – have amendments whose language 
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suggests that mere similarity between a recognized status and marriage will be invalid.195  How 
should courts analyze these provisions?   
As noted above, Alabama is the only Comparative Model MSA state that precludes 
recognition of a status for unmarried couples that “replicates” marriage.  A replica, of course, is 
an identical copy of some other entity; it is “an exact copy or model of something.”196  Applying 
this definition to the amendment, it is immediately clear that the only status designation covering 
a gay or lesbian relationship that is prohibited by the amendment is one that is identical to 
marriage.  The language of the amendment, then, is so narrow and precise that it would cover 
only a marriage substitute that mimics marriage along every axis.  As a technical matter, then, 
even a Vermont-style civil union regime or a California-style domestic partnership regime would 
be legal under the terms of the Alabama amendment!  Even though both regimes grant gay and 
lesbian couples rights that are equivalent to marriage under state law, they do not replicate 
marriage for one primary reason:  the Defense of Marriage Act ensures that these couples do not 
have the same rights as married heterosexual couples under federal law, thus creating a highly 
significant difference between marriage and civil union-like relationships.197  Currently, there are 
no same-sex relationships that perfectly replicate marriage from the formal standpoint of legal 
equality.198  Therefore, if a public employer in Alabama chose to grant employee benefits to its 
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gay and lesbian employees based on any of the criteria in the plans at stake in National Pride at 
Work, the amendment would not invalidate these plans.  None of the plans create or recognize a 
status that replicates marriage, so the state has retained significant discretionary authority in this 
instance to offer benefits to its gay and lesbian citizens. 
The next category of amendments – those which preclude the creation or recognition of 
status categories for unmarried couples that are identical or substantially similar to marriage – 
begs the question, “What is substantially similar to marriage?”199  The Alabama analysis 
explains how courts should understand the word “replicates,” or in this case, “identical,” but the 
understanding of “substantially similar” is less clear.  Again looking to the dictionary, 
“substantially” means “to a great or significant extent; for the most part; essentially.”200  The lack 
of clarity, however, arises when considering the meaning of the word “similar,” and this lack of 
clarity plagues the third category of amendments, as well.201  Insofar as dictionary definitions are 
concerned, “similar” means “like something but not exactly the same,”202 but this definition is 
not terribly helpful.  Is a domestic partner relationship “similar” to marriage if most of its 
attributes are held in common with marriage?  Is it similar if some of its attributes are held in 
common with marriage?  What if it has only one attribute in common with marriage – is it still 
similar in some relevant respect to marriage?  
The dictionary definition of “similar” clearly does not address the matter in adequate 
fashion.  A better source for defining “similar” is a group of cases which considered whether 
domestic partner registries and/or domestic partner benefits regimes established by state or local 
laws were sufficiently similar to marriage to violate state prohibitions on permitting same-sex 
marriage.203  In Knight v. Superior Court,204 Devlin v. City of Philadelphia,205 and Slattery v. 
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City of New York,206 the courts offered detailed analyses of those questions.  In doing so, they 
described civil marriage207 as comprised of two constitutive elements:  (1) a status component, 
and (2) a rights/benefits component.  The status component was acquired by meeting the entry 
requirements established by statute, and then formalizing the union in a state-sanctioned 
ceremony.  The rights and benefits of civil marriage, on the other hand, were simply the “bundle 
of sticks” that a couple received after acquiring marital status.208  Examining those cases will 
highlight some of the primary considerations that the Comparative Model MSA states should 
keep in mind when they are trying to evaluate this question of similarity.   
 
 1. Knight v. Superior Court 
 
Considerations of marital status, domestic partner status, and the comparison between the 
two are critical to the analysis in these cases, and Knight v. Superior Court does a masterful job 
of illustrating this point.   In Knight, the California Supreme Court considered whether the 
legislature violated the state’s Defense of Marriage Act (“Act” or “baby DOMA”209) when it 
passed new legislation granting “[r]egistered domestic partners . . . the same rights, protections,  . 
. . benefits, . . . responsibilities, obligations, and duties under law . . . as are granted to and 
imposed upon spouses.”210  California’s baby DOMA states as follows:  “Only marriage between 
a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.”211  Plaintiffs used this language in 
support of their claim that the Act was meant to accomplish two goals:  (1) prevent the 
recognition of same-sex marriage, and (2) exclusively reserve for married couples the rights and 
privileges associated with the institution.212  By extending those rights and privileges to 
unmarried couples, plaintiffs claimed that the domestic partnership statute effectively amended 
the Act.213  Since the Act was the subject of an initiative petition that was approved by the voters, 
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any amendments would also have to be approved by the voters.214  The domestic partner statute 
had not been subject to popular approval; as such, plaintiffs claimed that it was invalid.215  
The Court, however, rejected the plaintiffs’ analysis.  As an initial matter, the Court held 
that the plain language of the Act was “concerned only with who is entitled to obtain the status 
of marriage, and not with the rights and obligations associated with marriage.”216  It was true that 
the legislature could not unilaterally alter the definition of marriage as the union of one man and 
one woman; it was also true that the legislature had not done so when it passed the domestic 
partnership legislation.  The Court’s evaluation of the plain language of the Act did not end here.  
It also looked at more broadly-constructed same-sex marriage prohibitions that were passed 
around the nation and found that many of them explicitly stated that no unmarried couples would 
be entitled to the benefits and privileges of marriage. 217  This evidence suggested that if the 
drafters of California’s baby DOMA had intended to restrict the legislature’s ability to grant the 
rights and benefits of marriage to unmarried couples, they could have followed the models 
employed by these states.  Instead, they offered voters a more narrowly-constructed proposal 
whose language merely imposed a gender requirement on marriage.  In addition, the Court found 
that the objective intent underlying the Act supported this position.  After looking at the ballot 
materials that accompanied its passage, the Court held: 
 
 [The Act] was intended solely to preserve the status of marriage in California for persons 
of the opposite sex by preventing the recognition of marriages from other jurisdictions if 
those marriages are between homosexuals.  No mention [was] made of an intent to limit 
the rights and obligations of domestic partnerships, civil unions, or any other kind of 
same-sex relationship regardless of its characterization.  If this were the actual intent of 
the proponents of [the Act], the electorate was not given the opportunity to vote on that 
undisclosed objective.218 
 
It was clear to the voters that the sole purpose of the Act was to implement a gender-based 
gatekeeping requirement that would reserve marital status for opposite-sex couples.  No other 
considerations were on the table at the time.   
 Viewed in conjunction with the other gatekeeping requirements for marriage under 
California law, it was apparent that domestic partner status was not equivalent to marital status.  
First of all, couples who wished to marry had to acquire a license.219  Couples who wished to 
become domestic partners, on the other hand, merely had to file a Declaration of Domestic 
Partnership which specified their intent to form or continue a committed relationship.220  Second, 
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married couples who wished to divorce had to undergo proceedings that were overseen by a 
court. 221   The rules for terminating a domestic partnership, however, were quite different.  
Domestic partners who had no children, had been together less than five years, and who met 
particular conditions that bore on property and debt could terminate the partnership simply by 
filing a Notice of Termination with the Secretary of State.222  Ultimately, the comparison 
between marital status and domestic partner status revealed that the two were insufficiently 
similar to support plaintiffs’ claim. 
 The Court’s analysis, however, did not end with its consideration of status.  It also looked 
at the rights and benefits granted to civil marriage, and once again, found that between marriage 
and domestic partnerships were not equivalent.  Taking a close look at the function of the rights 
and benefits attached to marriage, the Court concluded that, “The policy favoring marriage is 
‘rooted in the necessity of providing an institutional basis for defining the fundamental relational 
rights and responsibilities of persons in organized society.’”223  The rights and responsibilities 
that flowed from marriage had a distinctly instrumental purpose – they were a crucial aspect of 
ensuring social stability.  Therefore, the legislature made a reasonable policy choice when it 
expanded the rights associated with domestic partnership, precisely because gays and lesbians 
were creating family structures that implicated the same societal concerns raised by married 
couples.  Since the law prevented gay and lesbian couples from getting married, the state needed 
another mechanism for regulating their relationships; the expanded rights and responsibilities 
offered by the domestic partner statute allowed the state to do this.224  Nevertheless, this wide-
ranging expansion of domestic partner rights and responsibilities was still not equivalent to the 
rights and responsibilities of married couples:   
 
[D]omestic partners do not receive a number of marital rights and benefits.  For 
example, they may not file joint tax returns and their earned income is not treated 
as community property for state income tax purposes, and they are not entitled to 
numerous benefits provided to married couples by the federal government, such 
as marital benefits relating to Social Security, Medicare, federal housing, food 
stamps, veterans’ benefits, military benefits, an federal employment benefit 
laws.225 
 
In light of this conclusion, the Court found that the plaintiffs’ request to invalidate the domestic 
partner statute should be denied.  Knight, then, is particularly instructive when trying to 
determine whether domestic partner status is sufficiently similar to marriage to violate a 
Comparative Model MSA amendment.  Even though the issue in Knight considered whether the 
statute in question rendered domestic partnerships equivalent to marriage, the California 
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Supreme Court identified the vast differences that exist between marriage and domestic 
partnerships, even when the state has gone as far as it possibly can to render the two equivalent.  
A case like Knight will surely assist other courts around the country when they try to decide 
whether the domestic partner status designations recognized by public employer benefits plans 
are sufficiently similar to marriage to constitute a violation of their respective amendments. 
 
2. Devlin v. City of Philadelphia 
 
 Devlin v. City of Philadelphia presented a set of factual circumstances that were 
measurably different from those at stake in the Knight case, but the analysis employed by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court also focused on the purported identity between a domestic partner 
relationship and marriage.226  The statute at issue in Devlin was different from the one examined 
in Knight – the domestic partner statute in Knight was akin to the civil union statutes of states 
like New Jersey and Vermont, while the statute in Devlin was structured like the typical domestic 
partner statutes found in localities around the country.227  In Devlin, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court held that the status created by this kind of domestic partner statute was highly distinct from 
the status created by the marriage laws. 
 The controversy in Devlin began when the Philadelphia City Council passed two bills, 
one of which amended the definition of “marital status” to include the status of being a “Life 
Partner,” and the other one of which required employers in the city who were not covered by 
ERISA to treat Life Partners as dependents who were eligible for employee benefits.228  After the 
City Council Passed the amendment to the city code, “marital status” was redefined to include 
“the status of being single, married, separated, divorced, widowed, or a life partner.”229  The 
plaintiffs argued that these statutes infringed on the state’s exclusive authority to regulate 
marriage because they effectively treated same-sex couples as married, but the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court disagreed.230   
 As an initial matter, including “life partner” in the definitional category of “marital 
status” did not result in any equation between “life partner” and “married.”  Rather, the Court 
found that “the reference to ‘the status of being . . . a life partner’ . . . merely supplement[ed] the 
terms ‘single,’ ‘divorced’ and ‘widowed’ as yet another unmarried ‘marital status.’”231  In 
addition, the Court noted that the myriad rights and responsibilities attendant upon marriage did 
not follow from achieving life partner status.  Life partners did not acquire the same rights that 
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married couples received in the areas of divorce, alimony, child support, child custody, and 
equitable distribution, among others.232  The rights and benefits that life partners acquired 
“[were] but a small fraction of what marriage affords its participants.”233  Finally, the Court 
found that the decision to provide employee benefits to life partners affected nothing more than 
“’the personnel and administration of the offices local to Philadelphia.’”234  As such, the Court 
could not reasonably conclude that the Philadelphia City Council had approved a marital 
equivalent in violation of state law. 
 
 3. Slattery v. City of New York 
 
 Last, in Slattery v. City of New York, the plaintiffs argued that city officials had infringed 
on the state’s exclusive authority to regulate in the area of marriage and domestic relations by 
passing the domestic partner statute. 235   Like the Supreme Courts of California and 
Pennsylvania, the court in Slattery rejected this claim.  First of all, the court noted that the 
criteria necessary for acquiring domestic partner status were different from those that were 
necessary for establishing marital status.  According to the local ordinance, a couple could 
register as domestic partners if their relationship met the following requirements:  (1) both were 
New York City residents, or at least one was employed by the city; (2) both individuals were at 
least eighteen years old; (3) neither individual was married to someone else; (4) neither 
individuals was a registered member of another domestic partnership; (5) at least six months had 
to have passed since the termination of any other domestic partnership of which either or both 
individuals had been a part; (6) neither  individual was related to each other in a manner that 
would prevent them from getting married under state law;  and (7) the partners lived together and 
shared a close, intimate, personal relationship.236  Once these characteristics were met, a couple 
could become domestic partners simply by signing an affidavit.237  These requirements differed 
substantially from those that were necessary for marriage under New York law.  Couples that 
wished to marry had to acquire a license, meet several health and blood testing requirements, and 
have the relationship solemnized by a state-approved officiant.238   
 The court also compared the benefits available to married couples and domestic partners, 
and used this distinction as another basis upon which the court distinguished marriage from 
domestic partnerships.  Married couples received rights, benefits, duties and obligations that 
simply did not follow from achieving domestic partner status.  Among the many privileges and 
obligations associated with marriage, the court specifically noted that married couples were able 
to legitimize their children; they enjoyed financial rights in their spouse’s properties; they had 
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rights that bore on the dispensation of estate assets after the death of a spouse; and they received 
various protections after the termination of a marriage.239  Domestic partners, on the other hand, 
did not receive these benefits and were not subject to these obligations.  Instead, registration 
merely ensured the following:  city employees who were in domestic partner relationships would 
be entitled to bereavement and child care leaves of absence, as well as certain health and 
retirement benefits; all domestic partners would have visitation rights in correctional facilities 
and health facilities operated by the city; and finally, all domestic partners living in buildings 
operated by the city or under the jurisdiction of the Department of Housing Preservation and 
Development would be characterized as “family members” for the purpose of determining 
succession or occupancy rights.240  All told, the rights and benefits that gays and lesbians 
acquired after registering as domestic partners did not begin to approximate those that 
heterosexual couples realized after getting married.  Therefore, it was not plausible to suggest 
that the city had created marriage by another name when it implemented the domestic 
partnership statute. 
  
D. Variable Prohibitions on Degrees of Similarity Between Domestic Partnerships 
and Marriage, and the Corresponding Impact on Partner Benefits Plans  
 
 The example of John and Jason will help a court determine whether the status recognized 
by John’s employer falls within the scope of the prohibition established by the particular 
amendment in question.  In order to see whether the plan proposed by John’s employer passes 
muster, the hypothetical must be evaluated under the three types of MSAs presented here:  those 
that prohibit the recognition of a status that is identical to marriage, those that prohibit the 
recognition of a status that is substantially similar to marriage, and those that prohibit the 
recognition of a status that is similar to marriage.   
 
1. “Identical to” Criterion 
 
In a state that prohibits the recognition of a status that is identical to marriage, Jason 
should be covered under the partner benefits policy.  As discussed above, the “identical to” 
language sets a high threshold that is difficult to meet, and would not be met in this case.  Knight, 
Devlin, Slattery, and similar cases are directly on point here:  When evaluating whether a status 
conferred by a partner benefits plan is equivalent to marriage, a court would have to consider the 
most important institutional aspects of marriage.  From the standpoint of the civil law, the most 
important institutional factors embodied in marriage are its status designation and the rights and 
benefits that flow from that status.  Just as the analyses in those cases concluded that the 
domestic partner designations at stake were not the equivalent of marriage, the same conclusion 
is true here.  The status recognized by John’s employer does not come close to marriage.  
Couples who wish to marry need not show that they are already financially interdependent; they 
need not prove that their relationship is an exclusive one; recently-divorced individuals are not 
subject to a waiting period before marrying another person; and finally, the parties need not live 
together.  It is true that in a Comparative Model MSA state, there is a gender requirement for 
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marriage that parallels the gender requirement in the partner benefits plan, and there are blood 
relationship requirements that a couple must also meet, but on balance, the two statuses simply 
are not equivalent. 
The lack of identity between John and Jason’s relationship and marriage becomes 
increasingly stark when one compares the benefit that they receive after acquiring a status under 
the employment contract, and the benefits that couples receive when they acquire marital status.  
Jason will receive one benefit – coverage under John’s health insurance policy – that arises from 
his eligible status.  Receiving this one benefit cannot reasonably sustain a claim of equivalence.  
First of all, health insurance is not a “benefit” of marriage; it is a fringe benefit of employment 
whose provision depends on the terms of the employment agreement, not the marital status of the 
employee.  This is demonstrated by the fact that many employers do not offer any health care 
benefits to their employees at all.241  Second, even if health insurance was a benefit of marriage, 
it is the only benefit that Jason would receive, as compared to the thousands of benefits that 
married couples receive under state and federal law.  No reasonable judge could find that the 
program in question here is identical to marriage.  Therefore, if John and Jason live in a state that 
prohibits the recognition of a status that is identical to marriage, the benefits program will be 
sustained. 
 
2. “Substantially Similar to” Criterion  
 
In a state that prohibits the recognition of a status that is “substantially similar” to 
marriage, Jason should still receive coverage under the partner benefits policy.  The analysis 
above explains how he will prevail under an “identical” analysis; the question now is how he will 
prevail under the “substantially similar” analysis.  As noted above, “substantially” means “to a 
great or significant extent; for the most part; essentially.”242  “Similar” means “like something 
but not exactly the same.”243  If these definitions are blended, one may conclude that the phrase 
“substantially similar” means “essentially the same as something, but not exactly like that 
something.”  How, exactly, does one determine whether one item embodies the essence of yet 
another item?  One plausible solution is to show that the most important characteristics of the 
former item are present in the latter.  Substantial similarity would therefore exist between two 
items if the most important characteristics of each were held almost entirely in common between 
the two. 
The relevant comparison, of course, is between domestic partnerships and marriage:  are 
the two regimes essentially equivalent, even if they are not exactly the same?  The Knight, 
Devlin, and Slattery courts offer some assistance here, as well, since the analyses in those cases 
turned on the core features of civil marriage – status and benefits.  If a court accepts that these 
elements are, in fact, the core of civil marriage, domestic partnerships are essentially equivalent 
if they mirror civil marriage along these two dimensions.  As noted above, however, this degree 
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of similarity simply does not exist. 244  First of all, the entry and exit requirements are different in 
marriage and domestic partnerships.  People who want to marry each other have to acquire 
licenses; people who wish to become domestic partners merely indicate their assent to the 
relationship.  In addition, married people who wish to exit the relationship must receive a 
judicially-reviewed divorce; domestic partners merely need to indicate their desire to terminate 
the relationship.  Moreover, the benefits that flow from marriage vastly outnumber the benefits 
that flow from membership in a domestic partnership.  It is true that there are some features in 
common.  Often times, both marriage and domestic partnership arrangements have gender 
requirements.  Similarly, they both tend to have blood relationship requirements.  Finally, both 
have anti-“polyunion” requirements.  These similarities notwithstanding, they simply do not rise 
to the level of substantial similarity. 
Looking, then, at John and Jason, the status conferred by the employment policy and the 
benefits received under it are not substantially similar to the essential elements of marriage.  
Even if there are admitted similarities that exist between the domestic partner relationship 
recognized by the policy and marriage, it is unquestionably true that most of the factors that bear 
on their status differ substantially from the factors that bear on marital status, and further, that the 
benefit they receive pales in comparison to the benefits they could receive if they were married.  
Therefore, John and Jason should prevail in a Comparative Model MSA state that adopts the 
“substantially similar” limitation on state recognition of unmarried relationships. 
 
3.  “Similar to” Criterion 
 
The analysis becomes substantially more difficult when considering whether the status 
recognized by the employment policy is similar to marriage.  Two things that are compared to 
each other are technically “similar” if they share every element in common; conversely, they are 
arguably “similar” if they share one aspect in common.  As discussed, the eligibility criteria in 
the John/Jason example are potentially similar to the eligibility criteria for marriage, and 
depending on the analysis employed by the state courts, this might be sufficient to invalidate the 
policy.  Having said that, the term “similarity,” standing alone, is an ambiguous one that does not 
convey any limiting principle on which a court might rest its analysis.  Therefore, what 
principled interpretive choices can a court make when trying to decide whether a partner benefits 
program like the one proposed for John and Jason violates the similarity prohibition of the 
amendment? 
 The answer to this question is frankly unclear, and will almost certainly be the subject of 
fierce litigation when the question presents itself.  One possible source of a resolution, however, 
comes from the evidence of the debates that surrounded the passage of these amendments.  This 
evidence might help a reviewing court decide whether the voters believed that the dispensation 
by public entities of domestic partner benefits policies would violate the amendment.  Reliance 
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on evidence of voter intent is not a revolutionary proposition; state law rules of constitutional 
interpretation regularly direct courts to engage in just this kind of analysis.  In fact, these rules 
commonly state that in the presence of linguistic ambiguity, courts must consider the intent of 
the voters when interpreting their constitutions.245  Given the ambiguity that exists in this case, a 
close examination of voter intent is appropriate.  In order to examine comprehensively the intent 
of the voters when passing the amendments, the following analysis will not simply focus on 
those states whose amendments prohibited mere similarity between marriage and other 
proscribed statuses; it will look at all of the Comparative Model MSA regimes because most of 
them were passed relatively contemporaneously, between 2004 and 2005. 
 
 
a. Evaluating the Voters’ Intent to Undermine Public Employers’ 
Rights to Offer Partner Benefits to Their Same-Sex Employees 
 
 Ascertaining the legislative intent behind a statute can be notoriously difficult for anyone 
who engages in the process of statutory construction.  If an objective intent cannot be divined 
from the face of the statute, questions will arise about the sources of authority from which the 
interpreter will draw when addressing the issue.  Are floor debates a legitimate source of 
authority for determining the intent behind a bill?  Are statements from bill sponsors legitimate 
sources?  Committee reports?  Explanations from floor managers?246  Moreover, how does one 
address the problem of competing intentions among legislators, or strategic intentions that are 
distinct from the subject matter of the bill?247  Courts and commentators have debated these 
questions for years, and those debates will undoubtedly continue to do so in the future. 
As difficult as it is to determine the intention of a legislative body when it passes a 
statute, determining the intent of voters who approve a statewide measure, such as an amendment 
to the state constitution, is necessarily even less precise.  The most reasonable approach to 
finding this intent is to rely on public sources which were widely available during the period in 
time when the measure was passed:   
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“Constitutional provisions and statutory enactments should be read and construed 
in light of the condition of affairs and circumstances existing at the time of their 
adoption” and “against which its provisions were directed, and in doing so the 
court will look to the public history of such time as the same can be gathered from 
the press, public writings, and the current literature of that time.”248 
 
Sources such as contemporaneous newspaper reports and editorials, transcripts from or 
recordings of broadcast public debates, any available reports from constitutional conventions or 
other deliberative bodies, books or pamphlets discussing the measure, and explanatory 
statements accompanying the ballot are legitimate avenues for extrapolating the intent of the 
voters.  While none of these resources will offer a definitive account of what the voters meant to 
accomplish when they passed the measure, they at least offer a reasonable assurance that a 
number of voters encountered them and may have been influenced by them. 
 Insofar as the marriage amendments are concerned, it is not clear whether voters in the 
Comparative Model MSA states intended to strip public entities of their authority to offer 
domestic partner benefits.  As an initial matter, there is copious evidence which suggests that, 
even if a number of voters did not subjectively intend that result, they reasonably should have 
known that the proposed language was sufficiently broad to encompass the possibility.  First of 
all, leading proponents of the amendments in several states were upfront about their desire to 
achieve this precise goal.  In Ohio, for instance, an official explanation of the marriage 
amendment which accompanied the ballot contained statements that supported and opposed the 
measure.249  One of the statements in support of the measure stated as follows:  “[The proposed 
marriage amendment] restricts governmental bodies in Ohio from using your tax dollars to give 
official status, recognition and benefits to homosexual and other deviant relationships that seek 
to imitate marriage.”250  This statement was submitted by the Ohio Campaign to Protect 
Marriage, which proposed the initiative petition that resulted in the amendment. 
Various supporters of the failed Arizona amendment251 were equally direct about the 
impact of the amendment.  The explanation which accompanied the Arizona ballot contained 
numerous statements of support for the amendment, two of which were provided by the Center 
for Arizona Policy, Inc. and the activist group, Protect Marriage Arizona.  The Center for 
Arizona Policy disputed the “myth” that “[p]rivate contracts [would] be voided” by responding 
that “[t]he amendment only applie[d] to the government[,] . . . . [and] ha[d] nothing to do with 
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private agreements.” 252  The statement from Protect Marriage Arizona was actually prepared by 
business leaders in the state who argued: 
 
[T]his measure will not affect the ability of private businesses to choose what 
benefits to grant their employees.  The amendment clearly applies only to public 
employers in the state of Arizona, for it states that no marriage substitutes can be 
recognized by the “state or its political subdivisions.”  Private businesses clearly 
do not fall in this category.253 
 
Arizona voters actually did heed these warnings.  Heterosexual voters – in particular, senior 
citizens – understood exactly how the amendment might undermine their lives:  “Arizona voters 
narrowly rejected their amendment, due in part to the sizeable percentage of savvy cohabiting 
seniors who realized it could be used to jeopardize their rights as domestic partners to, for 
example, visit each other in the hospital or make medical decisions.”254  Opponents of the 
measure ran a campaign that appealed to numerous constituencies – including same-sex couples, 
seniors, domestic violence survivors, unmarried heterosexual couples, and the business 
community – and in doing so, persuaded them that voting against the amendment was 
fundamentally in their own interest.255 
 Michigan provides another example where amendment backers expressly stated their 
desire to prevent public employers from offering domestic partner benefits.  One of the primary 
supporters of the Michigan marriage amendment was Gary Glenn, president of the American 
Family Association of Michigan.  On various occasions, media outlets reported Glenn’s 
interpretation of the amendment, which he believed would prevent public employers from 
offering domestic partner benefits:  “'Under [the amendment], every single person currently 
receiving any kind of benefit would continue to do so.  But it would not be on the basis of a 
government employer singling out homosexual relationships for the special treatment of being 
recognized as equal or similar to marriage.’”256  Similarly, the Michigan Family Forum, another 
leading supporter of the amendment, created a “Frequently Asked Questions” page on its website 
which addressed some of the major issues that were being debated during the election.257  The 
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page posed the following question:  “Will public universities be prohibited from providing 
benefits to partners of employees?”258  The Forum provided this answer:   
 
Legal experts disagree on how much this may restrict public universities.  The 
Michigan Constitution grants universities significant autonomy to govern 
themselves through their elected Boards.  It is reasonable to assume that state 
funds will be prohibited from from [sic] going to same-sex partner benefits while 
other funding sources, such as tuition, fees or donations, will be allowed to pay 
for same-sex partner benefits.259 
 
The answer to the question provided here was an honest, straightforward effort to educate the 
voter.  Universities, however, were not the only public entities about whom the Michigan Family 
Forum offered an opinion.  Another question asked, “Will unions or businesses be prohibited 
from negotiating contracts that offer benefits to same-sex partners of employees?”260  Once 
again, the Forum provided a direct, straightforward response:  “The state of Michigan will be 
prohibited from providing benefits to same-sex partners of state employees if those benefits are 
provided based on marital status, as most are.”261  Even if one assumes that only a small 
percentage of voters visited the Michigan Family Forum website, other proponents made a 
number of statements that were issued to the public in widespread fashion.  In fact, one poll 
taken prior to the election showed that 54 percent of voters believed that “’local governments 
and universities should not provide benefits, such as health and life insurance, to the partners of 
gay and lesbian employees.’”262  It is quite reasonable, then, to believe that Michigan voters were 
aware of the probable impact of the amendment on domestic partner benefits offered by public 
employers.263 
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 Proponents of the amendments, however, were not the only parties offering these 
assessments.  All across the country, opponents were busy sounding the alarm.  They made a 
sustained effort to educate the public about the likely impact of the amendments under 
consideration in their states, and it does not stretch credulity to believe that voters must have 
encountered these statements at some point in time.  The ballot explanation in Arizona, for 
instance, gave opponents a final opportunity to make their case before the voters, and they used it 
to express the fear that the amendment would hamper public employers’ abilities to offer partner 
benefits.264  Similarly, the non-partisan Citizens Research Council of Michigan noted that the 
Coalition for a Fair Michigan, a fierce opponent of the measure, claimed that “passage would 
eliminate existing domestic partner benefits that are provided by state universities and some 
other government employers, which give health care and other benefits to the unmarried partners 
of employees.”265  In South Dakota, the opponents did not make explicit reference to public 
employers and partner benefits, but they argued against the amendment by focusing on the 
impact that similar amendments in other states had on governmental functions: 
 
Voting NO doesn’t make gay marriage legal.  Voting NO keeps South Dakota the 
way it is right now.266  Voting NO tells legislators that we care about these issues, 
but not at the risk of creating unintended consequences. 
 
Voting yes had the unintended consequence of taking away health care for many 
unmarried families in Michigan. 
 
Voting yes had the unintended consequence of removing domestic violence 
protections for unmarried straight couples in Ohio.  Changing the Constitution 
tied judges’ hands and forced them to let abusers go free. 
 
Many senior couples don’t remarry for risk of losing Social Security and pension 
benefits.  Voting yes may remove their ability to make medical decisions for each 
other.   
 
Obviously, these statements were not persuasive to South Dakota’s voters, but they certainly 
gave the voters full information when weighing the potential consequences of a “yes” vote.267 
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 Finally, a number of objective assessments reached identical conclusions about the 
potential impact of the amendments.  The non-partisan Citizens Research Council of Michigan, 
for instance, concluded that the “[l]ong term implications of passage are open to interpretation 
and range from simply strengthening existing state law that prohibits same-sex marriages to 
reversing the legality of domestic partner benefits, same-sex or otherwise, offered by public and 
private employers.”268  The Idaho Secretary of State also weighed into the debate when he 
assessed the amendment that accompanied the ballot:  “The language [would] prohibit[] the state 
and its political subdivisions from granting any or all of the legal benefits of marriage to civil 
unions, domestic partnerships, or any other relationship that attempts to approximate 
marriage.”269  Virginia’s Attorney General offered an assessment of the amendment prior to that 
state’s election, and he concluded that insurance plans offered to domestic partners by private 
employers would not be affected by the amendment; by implication, of course, public employers 
could have been affected.270 
 All of the foregoing evidence notwithstanding, there is evidence that voters truly were 
confused.  Exit polling in Ohio after passage of the amendment, for instance, showed that 27 
percent of voters supported full marriage rights for gays and lesbians, 35 percent supported civil 
unions, and 27 percent opposed granting any legal rights to gays and lesbians.271  In other words, 
fully 62 percent of the voters opposed the substance of the measure!  The divergence between 
voter action and voter intent is equally dramatic in Utah, where 77 percent of voters believed that 
the amendment was only intended to define marriage.272  In fact, only 33 percent of those who 
voted for the amendment believed that it would “[p]revent gay and [l]esbian couples from having 
any basic benefits or rights, such as health insurance or hospital visitation.”273  Polling in Salt 
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Lake County presents even more pronounced evidence of confusion:  the amendment passed by 
54 percent in Salt Lake County, but less than one year later, 57 percent of those same voters 
supported “local governments in Utah providing basic health insurance benefits to long-term 
committed partners of gay and lesbian employees.”274  If these voters had intended to prevent 
domestic partners from receiving benefits from public entities, surely they would not have 
changed their minds within the space of one year. 
 What conclusions can one draw here?  It is clear that some portion of the electorate in the 
Comparative Model MSA states understood the wide-ranging impact of the amendments and 
appreciated the risk they posed to the domestic partners of gay and lesbian public employees.  
Undoubtedly, some of the voters were unclear and indifferent; still others were likely unclear and 
did not intend to create wide-ranging harm.  Nevertheless, if one considers certain national 
figures – for instance, the percentage of people nationally who support alternative marriage 
forms, the number of localities around the country that currently offer domestic partner benefits, 
the number of localities around the country that have implemented domestic partner registries, 
and the number of states that forbid discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in 
employment – combined with the evidence from individual states suggesting confusion in the 
electorate, one can tentatively conclude that the voters did not intend to prohibit the extension of 
partner benefits.  The evidence of national trends, however, cannot be weighed in dispositive 
fashion against the evidence presents itself in each individual state.  Therefore, the answer to the 
dilemma created by the ambiguous language used in the “similar to” amendments is deeply 
uncertain:  it truly depends on an assessment of the voters’ intent in each of the states. 
 
   b. Application 
 
This lack of clarity, then, extends to the question of whether the proposed hypothetical 
policy that would cover John and Jason passes muster in one of the states imposing a “similar to” 
criterion.  If they live in a state like Michigan, where a wealth of evidence supports the claim that 
the voters understood the risk to domestic partners who were employed by public entities, and at 
least some evidence shows that they approved of this outcome, the plan might be invalid.  On the 
other hand, if they live in a state like Wisconsin where the evidence shows that the framers of the 
amendment never intended to invalidate partner benefits offered by public entities, they might be 
able to prevail on their claims.275  At the end of the day, a court in a “similar to” state that was 
reviewing John and Jason’s claim should examine closely the evidence of voter intent before 
finding that the policy should be either upheld or invalidated under the amendment.    
 
Conclusion 
 
As equality advocates develop strategies for ensuring that gay and lesbian employees 
receive domestic partner benefits on the same basis as their heterosexual colleagues, they should 
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take heart in knowing that some of the most far-reaching amendments may, in fact, be less 
damaging than originally supposed.  Fair interpretations of many of these amendments should 
result in the conclusion that partner benefits regimes remain valid under state law.  Of course, 
new developments may obviate this concern.  In response to the pressures that have been placed 
on their partner benefits programs, some public entities have begun to restructure their policies in 
such a way that gay and lesbian employees and their partners would still qualify for coverage, 
but the policies themselves would no longer turn on the existence of a domestic partner 
relationship.  Michigan State University, for instance, has implemented a pilot program that 
would offer benefits to a category of people that it describes as “other eligible individuals.”276  A 
person would qualify for benefits if he or she had lived with a non-unionized employee for 
eighteen months or more without being a tenant or dependent, and if the person was not 
automatically eligible to inherit the employee’s property under Michigan law.277  Another option 
that a public entity might employ is to establish a “household benefits” plan that would allow an 
employee to designate one adult household member for coverage.278  In fact, two private 
employers – Nationwide Insurance and Catholic Charities, a San Francisco-based non-profit 
employer – have implemented household benefits plans.279  Plans like these, which base the 
receipt of benefits on neutral criteria, might ultimately be the wave of the future.  If, however, 
these plans are not ideal because their fiscal impact is too great, or because some courts might 
invalidate them as transparent attempts to evade the prohibition of an amendment, the foregoing 
analysis might offer guidance to advocates who wish to protect the families of gays and lesbians 
around the country. 
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Appendix 1 
 Comparative Model Multi-Subject Amendments  
 Text Citation 
Alabama “A union replicating marriage of or between persons of the same 
sex in the State of Alabama or in any other jurisdiction shall be 
considered and treated in all respects as having no legal force or 
effect in this state and shall not be recognized by this state as a 
marriage or other union replicating marriage.” 
Ala. Const.  
amend. 774 
Arkansas “Legal status for unmarried persons which is identical or 
substantially similar to marital status shall not be valid or 
recognized in Arkansas, except that the legislature may recognize 
a common law marriage from another state between a man and a 
woman.” 
 
Ark. Const. 
amend. 83. 
Idaho “A marriage between a man and a woman is the only domestic 
legal union that shall be valid or recognized in this state.” 
Idaho Const. art. 
III, § 28. 
Kentucky “A legal status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage 
for  individuals shall not be valid or recognized.” 
Ky. Const. part II,  
§ 233A 
Louisiana “A legal status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage 
for unmarried individuals shall not be valid or recognized.” 
La. Const. art. 
XII, § 15.  
Michigan “To secure and preserve the benefits of marriage for our society 
and for future generations of children, the union of one man and 
one woman in marriage shall be the only agreement recognized as 
a marriage or similar union for any purpose.” 
Mich. Const. art. 
I, § 25.  
Nebraska “The uniting of two persons of the same sex in a civil union, 
domestic partnership, or other similar same-sex relationship shall 
not be valid or recognized in Nebraska.” 
Neb. Const. art I, 
§ 29. 
North Dakota “No other domestic union, however denominated, may be 
recognized as a marriage or given the same or substantially 
equivalent legal effect.” 
N.D. Const. art. 
XI, § 28. 
Ohio “This state and its political subdivisions shall not create or 
recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals 
that intends to approximate the design, qualities, significance or 
effect of marriage.” 
Ohio Const. art. 
XV, § 11. 
South Carolina “A marriage between one man and one woman is the only lawful 
domestic union that shall be valid or recognized in this State.  This 
State and its political subdivisions shall not create a legal status, 
right or claim respecting any other domestic union, however 
denominated.  This State and its political subdivisions shall not 
recognize or give effect to a legal status, right or claim created by 
another jurisdiction respecting any other domestic union, however 
denominated.  Nothing in this section shall impair any right or 
benefit extended by the State or its political subdivisions other 
than a right or benefit arising from a domestic union that is not 
valid or recognized in this State.” 
S.C. Const. art. 
XVII, § 15.  
South Dakota “The uniting of two or more persons in a civil union, domestic 
partnership, or other quasi-marital relationship shall not be valid 
or recognized in South Dakota.” 
S.D. Const. art. 
XXI, § 9. 
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Texas “This state or a political subdivision of this state may not create or 
recognize any legal status identical or similar to marriage.” 
Tex. Const. art I. § 
32. 
Utah “No other domestic union, however denominated, may be 
recognized as a marriage or given the same or substantially 
equivalent legal effect.” 
Utah Const. art. I, 
§ 29. 
Virginia “This Commonwealth and its political subdivisions shall not 
create or recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried 
individuals that intends to approximate the design, qualities, 
significance or effects of marriage.  Nor shall this Commonwealth 
or its political subdivisions create or recognize another union, 
partnership, or other legal status to which is assigned the rights, 
benefits, obligations, qualities, or effects of marriage.” 
Va. Const. art. I, § 
15.  
Wisconsin “A legal status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage 
for unmarried individuals shall not be valid or recognized in this 
state.” 
Wis. Const. art. 
XIII, § 13. 
 
 
Appendix 2 
 Incidents Model Multi-Subject Amendments  
 Text Citation 
Georgia “No union between persons of the same sex shall be recognized by 
this state as entitled to the benefits of marriage.” 
Ga. Const. art. I, § 
4.  
Kansas “No relationship, other than a marriage, shall be recognized by the 
state as entitling the parties to the rights or incidents of marriage.” 
Kan. Const. art. 
XV, § 16.  
Oklahoma “Neither this Constitution nor any other provision of law shall be 
construed to require that marital status or the legal incidents 
thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups.” 
Okla. Const. art. 
II, § 35. 
Virginia “This Commonwealth and its political subdivisions shall not 
create or recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried 
individuals that intends to approximate the design, qualities, 
significance or effects of marriage.  Nor shall this Commonwealth 
or its political subdivisions create or recognize another union, 
partnership, or other legal status to which is assigned the rights, 
benefits, obligations, qualities, or effects of marriage.” 
Va. Const. art. I, § 
15.  
 
 
Appendix 3 
 Single-Subject Amendments  
 Text Citation 
Alaska “To be valid or recognized in this State, a marriage may exist only 
between one man and one woman.” 
Alaska Const. art. 
I, § 25.  
Colorado “Only a union of one man and one woman shall be valid or 
recognized as a marriage in this state.” 
Colo. Const. art. 
II, § 31. 
Hawaii “The legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to 
opposite-sex couples.” 
Haw. Const. art. I, 
§ 23. 
Mississippi “Marriage may take place and may be valid under the laws of this 
state only between a man and a woman.” 
Miss. Const. art. 
XIV, § 263A 
Missouri “That to be valid and recognized in this state, a marriage shall 
exist only between a man and a woman.” 
Mo. Const. art. I, 
§ 33. 
Montana “Only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid 
or recognized as a marriage in this state.” 
Mont. Const. art 
XIII, § 7. 
Nevada  “Only a marriage between a male and female person shall be 
recognized and given effect in this state.” 
Nev. Const. art. I. 
§ 21. 
Oregon  “It is the policy of Oregon, and its political subdivisions, that only Or. Const. art. 
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a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or 
legally recognized as a marriage.” 
XV, § 5.  
Tennessee “The historical institution and legal contract solemnizing the 
relationship of one man and one woman shall be the only legally 
recognized marital contract in this state.” 
Tenn. Const. art 
XI, § 18. 
 
 
 
 
 
